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SAVING SMOKERS FROM THEMSELVES: THE PATERNALISTIC
USE OF CIGARETTE TAXES
GaryLucas, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

Governments at all levels are increasingly relying on cigarette taxes
to satisfy revenue needs.' These taxes affect a shrinking minority and
burden an activity that many view as sinful. So legislators can increase
these taxes at relatively low political cost. 2 It comes as no surprise then
that most states have increased their cigarette tax in recent years, with
many doing so multiple times. As a result, cigarette tax revenue is
substantial, exceeding $32 billion in 2010. 4 To put that figure in
perspective, the federal government anticipates that gift and estate tax
revenue will total less than $26 billion for 2011 and 2012 combined. 5
Additionally, the tax burden on smokers is significant. The federal

tax is $1.01 per pack and the average state tax is $1.17 per pack.6 The
highest combined federal, state, and local tax is $6.86 per pack in New
York City, where a pack-a-day smoker pays over $2,500 per year in
cigarette taxes.7
Antismoking advocates often argue that taxing cigarettes is both an
effective way to raise revenue and to force smokers to internalize the
costs that smoking imposes on others.8 But a compelling case can be
• Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan School of Law. I thank participants at the 2010
Central States Law Schools Association Conference, the Faculty Enrichment Series of Florida State
College of Law, and the 2011 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting for helpful ideas and
suggestions. I also thank Frank Snyder for comments on an earlier draft.
1. See, e.g., Eleanor Maag & David Merriman, Tax Policy Responses to Revenue Shortfalls, 29
ST. TAX NOTES 363, 367-72 (2003).
2. Id. at 367-72; W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking,
in 9 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 52 (James Poterba, ed., 1995) [hereinafter Viscusi, Social
Consequences].
3. 45 ORZECHOWSKI & WALKER, THE TAX BURDEN ON TOBACCO 9-10 (2010). Between

January 1,2009 and January 1, 2011, 21 states and the federal government increased cigarette taxes. Id.
4. Id. at iv. This figure includes federal, state, and local excise taxes for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 2010. Id.
5. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, HistoricalTables, Table 2.5: Composition of "OtherReceipts,"

1940-2016, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals (last visited Aug. 27,
2012).
6. ORZECHOWSKI & WALKER, supra note 3, at iv.
7. See CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, TOP COMBINED STATE-LOCAL CIGARETTE TA
RATES (2010), available at http://tobaccofreekids.orgresearch/factsheets/pdf/0267.pdf. The combined
tax is composed of the federal tax of $1.01 per pack, the state tax of $4.35 per pack, and the city tax of
$1.50 per pack. The $2,500 figure assumes that the smoker actually buys her cigarettes in New York

city.
8. E.g., CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, TOBACCO TAX INCREASES ARE A RELIABLE
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made that neither of these rationales supports the large tax burden
currently placed on tobacco. Using cigarette taxes to raise revenue is
problematic because smokers are disproportionately poor. As a result,
cigarette taxes are highly regressive. Moreover, several studies have
per pack more than covers any
concluded that the current average tax
0
external costs borne by nonsmokers.'
If external costs and the need for revenue do not justify higher
cigarette taxes, then proponents of cigarette tax increases must rely on
paternalism, i.e., the idea that the government should save smokers from
It involves
Paternalism is highly controversial.
themselves. "
interfering with individual autonomy despite the absence of harm to
third parties. This gives rise to the accusation that paternalistic
intervention unjustifiably forces paternalists' values and beliefs onto
others.
Historically, economists and economically oriented legal scholars
12
have been particularly skeptical of paternalistic smoking regulations.
Standard economic models generally assume that people are rational,
which means, among other things, that we accurately weigh costs and
benefits so as to make choices that maximize our utility (or wellbeing). 13 At least partly as a result of their faith in people's decisionmaking abilities, economists often advocate consumer sovereignty. This
is the principle that the government should respect people's choices
regarding what products to consume and should interfere with those

SOURCE OF SUBSTANTIAL NEw STATE REVENUE 1-2 (2008) [hereinafter CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCOat
available
RELIABLE
SOURCE],
FREE
KIDS,

http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factshets/pdf70303.pdf; HearingBefore the House Comm. on
Ways and Means on the FinancingProvisionsof the Administration'sHealth Security Act, 103d Cong.
(1993) (statement of Jeffrey Harris).
9. See infra Part IV.D.
10. See infra Part I.B.2.
1I. For purposes of this Article, I define paternalism broadly as interference by the government
with a person's self-regarding decisions, where the government's intent is to further that person's
welfare. Cf Bill New, Paternalismand Public Policy, 15 ECON. & PHIL. 63, 65-71 (1999) (using a
similar definition).
12. W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 144-46 (1992) [hereinafter
VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION]; ROBERT D. TOLLISON & RICHARD E. WAGNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
SMOKING ix-xi, 162-64 (1992); see also Thomas A. Lambert, The CaseAgainst Smoking Bans, 13 MO.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 94, 103 (2006) (arguing that since smokers "appear to believe that the benefits
that they experience from the activity outweigh the costs [it is] not at all clear that eliminating smoking
will enhance social welfare"); Jonathan Gruber & Botond K6szgi, Is Addiction "Rational"? Theory
and Evidence, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1261, 1285-86 (2001) [hereinafter Gruber & K6szegi, Is Addiction
Rational?] (explaining but rejecting the model of smoking that has led some economists to criticize
paternalistic regulation).
13. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 496 (4th ed. 2007); Colin
Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Casefor "Asymmetric
Paternalism", 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1214-15 (2003).
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choices only to prevent harm to others. 14
To many non-economists, consumer sovereignty seems inappropriate
in the case of cigarettes, which are addictive and cause health damage.
But some economists arge that people can rationally choose to
consume addictive goods. 5 If so, then it is not obvious why the
government should treat the decision to smoke any differently than other
consumption decisions. Indeed, government efforts to reduce smoking
would harm smokers instead of helping them.
But there are alternative theories of smoking consistent with a role for
paternalism. One theory is that smokers are incapacitated by addiction.
Some physicians and public health advocates believe that addiction
constitutes a disease that effectively deprives the addict of free will. 16 If
people smoke because they are incapacitated by addiction, then arguably
smoking has no social value and the government's goal should be to
eliminate it.
Another group of theories recognizes smoking as a choice but
suggests that the choice is flawed-the product of smokers' imperfect
rationality. 17 These theories stem from a more general critique of the
rational actor model-a critique spearheaded by an increasingly
influential group of paternalistic economists and legal scholars.' 8 These
14. See, Paul Calcott, Paternalism and Public Choice, 17 VICTORIA ECON. COMMENT. 39, 39-41
(2000); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 59, 86-88 (1999).
15. See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of RationalAddiction, 86 J. POL. ECON.
675, 694-95 (1988).
16. E.g., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., TREATING TOBACCO USE DEPENDENCE: 2008
UPDATE 6 (2008) ("Tobacco dependence is a chronic disease."); DENNIS L. THOMBS, INTRODUCTION TO
ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 3-5 (1994) (describing the disease model of addiction); Jacob Sullum, Blowing
Smoke aboutAddiction, Ability to Quit, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 25, 1997, at A23 (quoting David Kessler, a
former commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, who said, "Once they have started smoking
regularly, most smokers are in effect deprived of the choice to stop smoking.").
17. Gruber & Kbszegi, h Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1285-86; Jon D. Hanson &
Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex-Post Incentive-Bared Regulation,
107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1181-1223 (1998).
18. See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159 (2003); Camerer et al., supra note 13; Gruber & Kaszegi, Is
Addiction Rational?, supra note 12; Jonathan Gruber & Botond K~szegi, Tax Incidence When
Individuals Are Time-Inconsistent: The Case of Cigarette Excise Taxes, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1959, 1980
(2004) [hereinafter Gruber & K6szegi, Tax Incidence]; JONATHAN GRUBER & BOTOND KOSZEGI, A
MODERN ECONOMIC VIEW OF TOBACCO TAXATION 17 (2008) [hereinafter GRUBER & KOSZEGI,
MODERN VIEW]; Jonathan Gruber, Government Policy Toward Smoking: A View from Economics, 3
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L & ETHICS 119, 120 (2002); Hanson & Logue, supra note 17; Ted
O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1825 (2006) [hereinafter
O'Donoghue & Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes]; Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal
Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 186 (2003). Mario Rizzo and
Glen Whitman have challenged the claim that failures of rationality justify paternalism. Although they
devote some attention to smoking, their subject is paternalistic regulation generally, and they discuss
cigarette taxes only tangentially. As a result, they do not address many of the issues on which this
Article focuses. See generally Mario J. Rizzo & D. Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New
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scholars rely on evidence from psychology and behavioral economics,
which shows that people are not perfectly rational. Instead, people
suffer from self-control problems as well as cognitive limitations and
biases. 19 These scholars argue that if people are imperfectly rational,
then we may make mistakes that reduce our utility. In theory,
government intervention can avoid or correct these mistakes.
Moreover, unlike traditional paternalistic measures, this type of
intervention would purportedly make us better off as judged by our own
internal standards, not those of the paternalists who advocate the
regulation. In other words, the government could help us make the
choices that we would make ourselves if we were perfectly rational.2 '
In the smoking context, economists and legal scholars use evidence of
imperfect rationality to challenge the claim that smoking is a welfaremaximizing choice.22 For example, Jonathan Gruber and Botond
K6szegi argue that many smokers would like to give up smoking but
lack the self-control2 3 to do so. 24 Gruber and K6szegi conclude that a
paternalistic tax on cigarettes would make smokers better off by giving
them an additional 25incentive to quit, in effect compensating for their
lack of self-control.
If smoking results from incapacitation or imperfect rationality, then
perhaps the government should intervene on smokers' behalf. But this
Article challenges the claim that the government should use cigarette
taxes for that purpose. While there is evidence that smoking can be a
rational choice, this Article does not claim that all smokers are acting
rationally. Instead, this Article argues that even if some smokers are

Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905 (2009) [hereinafter Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem];
Mario Rizzo & D. Glen Whitman, Little Brother Is Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slippery
Slopes, 51 AIZ. L. REv. 685 (2009) [hereinafter Rizzo & Whitman, Slippery Slopes]; D. Glen
Whitman, Against the New Paternalism: Internalities and the Economics of Self-Control, POL'Y
ANALYSIS No. 563 (2006).
19. E.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 18, at 1159-70; Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 121119; Gruber & K6szegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1285-86.
20. E.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 18, at 1162; Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 1218.
21. E.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 18, at 1162 ('[I]t is legitimate for private and public
institutions to attempt to influence people's behavior even when third-party effects are absent" because
"in some cases individuals make inferior decisions in terms of their own welfare-decisions that they
would change if they had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of selfcontrol.").
22. Gruber & K6szegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1285-86; Hanson & Logue,
supra note 17, at 1181-1223.
23. For purposes of this Article, self-control simply refers to the inability of an individual to
carry out the consumption plan that she deems best. For a discussion of the issues involved in defining
willpower, which is sometimes used as a synonym for self-control, see Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower
Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1376-80 (2011) [hereinafter Fennell, Willpower Taxes].
24. Gruber & K6szegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1261.
25. See id.
at 1263.
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acting irrationally, a number of reasons exist to be skeptical of
paternalistic cigarette taxes.
Part I explains the theory that smoking is a rational choice and
discusses evidence consistent with this theory. If smoking is rational,
then paternalistic taxes are difficult to justify.
Part II discusses evidence that, according to paternalists, shows that
smoking is not a rational choice. This evidence gives rise to the theory
that smokers are incapacitated by addiction and to theories based on
imperfect rationality.
Part III argues that incapacitation does not justify paternalistic taxes.
First, incapacitation does not appear to drive all or even most smoking
behavior. Incapacitation is inconsistent with the fact that tens of
millions of people have quit smoking. 26 Second, even if we assume that
some smokers simply cannot quit, cigarette taxes are not an appropriate
response. Taxes effectively punish these smokers by increasing the
price of a product that they find difficult or impossible to live without.
Similarly, Part IV argues that imperfect rationality does not justify
paternalistic taxes. There are several reasons for this. The first is
heterogeneity. Some people may smoke due to failures of rationality, in
which case cigarette taxes have the potential to make them better off by
encouraging them to quit. But for others, smoking may be a rational
choice. For example, a large percentage of smokers quit early enough
that they virtually eliminate their risk of premature death.27 In other
words, they smoke as young adults and then quit before the risk
becomes very high. This suggests rational behavior.
If smokers are heterogeneous with respect to rationality, cigarette
taxes are ill-suited as a paternalistic tool. Taxes are a one-size-fits-all
solution that will harm rational smokers. And this harm must be offset
against (and may exceed) any benefit to those who are helped.
The second reason is that paternalistic taxes create a significant
potential for government failure. Even if some smoking is caused by
imperfect rationality, government intervention can harm smokers more
than it helps them. Government failure may occur for several reasons,
including lack of control over smokers' responses to taxation. Many
smokers respond to cigarette taxes in harmful ways, e.g., they smoke
28
fewer cigarettes but switch to cigarettes higher in tar and nicotine.
These responses can undermine the goal of improving public health.
The third reason is regressivity. Low-income smokers respond to
cigarette taxes by reducing spending on necessities, e.g., housing, which
26. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR U.S.

ADULTS: 2009 NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY 10, 85 (2010) [hereinafter CDC].
27. See infra Part I.A.2.
28. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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adversely affects low-income families. 29
The fourth reason is that potentially superior alternatives exist for
helping smokers who suffer from imperfect rationality. These include
the commitment contract for smoking cessation and the smoking
license. 30 These solutions address failures of rationality while reducing
the possibility of government failure and avoiding the problems caused
by heterogeneity. These solutions are also more consistent with
individual autonomy and do not impose a large burden on the poor.
Part V discusses whether the goal of reducing youth smoking justifies
paternalistic taxes. Part V also argues that since the cigarette tax is a
blunt tool for achieving this goal, the government should consider more
narrowly targeted options, e.g., raising the minimum age for legal sale
of cigarettes to twenty-one.
I.

SMOKING AS A RATIONAL CHOICE

Given the enormous risks involved, why do people smoke?
According to some economists, the answer may be that smoking is a
rational choice. Subpart A discusses rational addiction theory and
evidence that supports the theory. Subpart B describes the theory's
implications for cigarette tax policy. For purposes of this Article, the
most important of these implications is that paternalistic taxes are
unjustified.
A. Theory and Evidence
Standard economic models generally assume that people are
rational. 3 1 This means that we are informed and forward looking, and
we accurately weigh the costs and benefits of our actions to maximize
our own utility given our preferences, which are generally assumed to be
stable.32
It may seem impossible for this model to explain smoking because
unlike many consumer goods, cigarettes are addictive and can cause

29. Susan H. Busch et al., Burning a Hole in the Budget: Tobacco Spending and its Crowd-Out
of Other Goods, 3 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL'Y 263, 267-71 (2004).
30. Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1399, 1482-85 (2005) [hereinafter
Fennell, Revealing Options]; see generally Xavier Gine et al., Put Your Money Where Your Butt Is: A
Commitment Savings Account for Smoking Cessation, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 213 (2010); Jay
Bhatacharya & Darius Lakdawalla, Time-Inconsistency and Welfare (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10345, 2004).
31. E.g., Gruber, supra note 18, at 120; MANKIW, supra note 13, at 496; Camerer et al., supra
note 13, at 1214-15.
32. E.g., Gruber, supra note 18, at 120; MANKIW, supra note 13, at 496; Camerer et aL, supra
note 13, at 1214-15; Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 675.
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health damage. But Nobel Prize-winning economist Gary Becker and
coauthor Kevin Murphy have shown that addiction does not necessarily
rule out the standard model. 3 Rather, addiction simply complicates the
cost-benefit calculation. Instead of weighing the costs and benefits of
smoking a single cigarette, a person must account for the possibility of
addiction. 4 Addiction means that smoking today increases the desire to
smoke in the future. And future smoking increases both monetary costs
(through additional cigarette expenditures) and health damage. A
rational smoker considers smoking's current and future costs, taking
addiction and health damage into account. In other words, a smoker
might know that she could become addicted and harm her. health, but
still choose to smoke anyway because she has rationally determined that
smoking is worth the risk.
Several types of evidence are consistent with the notion that smoking
may result from rational calculation. The first is evidence that smoking
produces certain benefits. The second is evidence that people consider
potential costs in deciding whether to smoke or to continue smoking.
And the third is evidence that smoking may have a lower subjective
price for smokers than for nonsmokers.
1. Possible Benefits of Smoking
People may smoke because smoking produces benefits apart from
avoiding the pain of withdrawal associated with quitting. Some people
may simply enjoy the taste of cigarettes.35 Others smoke because they
believe (with some evidentiary support) that smoking has a number of
positive effects, including reducing stress, depression, and anxiety,
aiding in concentration and memory, preventing weight gain, 36 and
facilitating social interaction.37 Nicotine is an unusual drug that can
33. Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 675.
34. Id. at 675-82; GRUBER & KOSZEGi, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 4; Gruber, supra note
18, at 120.
35. Frank A. Sloan & Yang Wang, Economic Theory and Evidence on Smoking Behavior of
Adults, 103 ADDICTION 1777, 1779 (2008).
36. For a discussion of whether quitting smoking leads to weight gain, see infra Part IV.B.3.
37. Stephen Heishman, a scientist at the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and his colleagues
recently published a meta-analysis of 41 studies of the effects of nicotine on both smokers and
nonsmokers. Stephen J. Heishman et al., Meta-Analysis ofthe Acute Effects ofNicotine and Smoking on
Human Performance, 210 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 453, 453 (2010). The study finds "significant
positive effect sizes of nicotine on motor abilities, attention, and memory, which likely represent true
performance facilitation." Id. at 464. Because the study finds significant positive effects for
nonsmokers as well as smokers, Heishman concludes that "nicotine's performance enhancing effects
might be one reason people decide to start smoking." Id.; see also Cynthia Pomerleau, Co-Factors for
Smoking and Evolutionary Psychobiology, 92 ADDICTION 397, 400-01 (1997); Naomi Breslau et al.,
Nicotine Dependence, Major Depression, and Anxiety in YoungAdults, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
1069, 1071-73 (1991). In a survey of smokers aged 50-70, 41% reported that they had relapsed after
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both calm a nervous person and stimulate a sluggish one.38
Moreover, just as tastes for other consumer goods may differ, tastes
for smoking may differ. In particular, smoking may deliver a larger
benefit to people who are especially stressed, anxious, or depressed,
which could explain why some people smoke and others do not.
Because of the risks involved, it may seem distasteful to discuss the
potential benefits of smoking. And the fact that smoking may yield
certain benefits certainly does not mean that smokers should ignore the
consequences to their health. But it does mean that smoking is not
obviously irrational. Some people might decide that the risk is worth it
in the same way that people rationally decide to engage in other risky
activities, e.g., driving on busy highways or skiing.40
2. Accounting for Smoking's Costs
There is substantial evidence that people consider potential costs in
making smoking decisions. For example, many smokers respond to
cigarette price increases by cutting back or quitting altogether.
Although findings vary, a typical estimate of the price elasticity of
cigarettes among adults is roughly -0.3 to -0.5.4 1 This means that a 10%
increase in price leads to a 39/o-5% reduction in smoking, due to some
smokers quitting and others cutting back.42 Moreover, although the
issue is controversial, a recent study finds that even older smokers (those
who are presumably the most addicted) respond to higher cigarette
prices by quitting smoking.43 The price elasticity studies establish that
people generally do consider the immediate financial costs of smoking.
People are also forward-looking and take into account future costs,
e.g., possible health damage. In 1964, the Surgeon General issued a
report announcing that smoking significantly increases the risk of lung

quitting due to stress. Only 14% reported relapse due to habit or physical addiction. Ahmed Khwaja et
al., Time Preference, Time Discounting, and Smoking Decisions, 26 J. HEALTH ECON. 927, 930 (2007)
[hereinafter Khwaja et al., Time Preference].
38. Robert S. Goldfarb et al., Are Rival Theories of Smoking Underdetermined?, 8 J. ECON.
METHODOLOGY 229, 232 (2001); see also Pomerleau, supra note 37, at 400.
39. See Pomerleau, supra note 37, at 397-401.
Time Preference, supra note 37, at 930 ("Judging from the reasons that
40. Cf.Khwaja et al.,
people give for quitting and relapsing, more is at work than simple physical addiction.").
41. FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., THE PRICE OF SMOKING 9 (2004).
42. Id.
43. Philip DeCicca & Logan McLeod, Cigarette Taxes and Older Adult Smoking: Evidence from
Recent Large Tax Increases, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 918, 928 (2008) [hereinafter DeCicca, Older Adult
Smoking] (finding "that a $1 increase [in the cigarette tax] results in a 6-8% reduction in smoking
A number of earlier studies find very little
participation among individuals aged 45-59").
responsiveness among older smokers. For a review of this literature, see id.at 919-20.
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cancer and certain other illnesses, as well as premature death.44 Since
then, the dangers of smoking have been well publicized, and the fact that
smoking is dangerous is now common knowledge.45 Changes in the
perceived risks of smoking have no doubt played a large role in the
dramatic decline in the adult smoking rate, which fell from about 42% in
1965 to just under
21% in 2009.4P This suggests rational, forward47
looking behavior.
Another compelling piece of evidence that smokers account for health
risks is the fact that so many people have quit smoking. In the United
States, there are as many former smokers as current smokers. 48 And
many former smokers quit to improve their health. 49 Research has
confirmed the dramatic health benefits of quitting smoking, even during
old age.50 Quitting can substantially reduce the risk of smoking-related
illness and can significantly prolong life. sl
Not only have many smokers quit, smoking duration (i.e., the period
of time a smoker smokes before quitting) is also on the decline.5 2 In
other words, smokers are quitting at younger ages today than in the past.
A study by John Pierce and Elizabeth Gilpin estimates the median
cessation age of successive cohorts of smokers.5 3 (The median cessation
age is the age by which 50% of smokers from a particular cohort quit
smoking.)5 4 The estimated median cessation age for smokers born
between 1900 and 1904 is age 66 for white males and age 70 for white

44. U.S. SURGEON GEN., SMOKIN AND HEALTH, 31-32 (1964).
45. VIscusI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 78 (citing a survey in which 99% of respondents
"had heard that cigarettes shorten life, and all of the respondents had heard that cigarettes are dangerous
to one's health").
46. See RONALD WILSON, CIGARETTE SMOKING AND HEALTH CHARACTERISTICS 1 (1967);
CDC, supranote 26, at 88.
47. See Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 687 (noting that the decline in the smoking rate
after 1964 "blatantly contradicts the view that the majority of smokers were myopic and would not
respond to information about future consequences because they discounted the future heavily").
48. CDC, supra note 26, at 10, 85. A current smoker is "someone who has smoked at least 100
cigarettes in their lifetimes and still currently smokes," and former smokers consist of people "who have
smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their lifetime but currently do not smoke at all." CDC, supra note 26,
at 86.
49. Lynn C. Lrabie, To What Extent Do Smokers Plan Quit Attempts?, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL
425, 426 (2005); Khwaja et al., Time Preference,supra note 37, at 930.
50. Donald H. Taylor, Jr. et al., Benefits of Smoking Cessation for Longevity, 92 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 990, 994 (2002); U.S. SURGEON GEN., THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF SMOKING CESSATION vi-vii,
8 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 SURGEON GEN.'S REPORT].
51. Taylor et al.,
supra note 50, at 994; 1990 SURGEON GEN.'S REPORT, supra note 50, at vi-vii,
8.
52. John P. Pierce & Elizabeth Gilpin, How Long Will Today's New Adolescent Smoker Be
Addicted to Cigarettes?,86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 253,253-54 (1996).
53. Id. at 253-54.
54. See id. at 253-54.
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females.55 By contrast, the estimated median cessation age for smokers
born between 1975 and 1979 is age 33 for white males and age 36 for
born
white females. 56 In other words, as many as half of smokers
57
mid-30s
their
by
smoking
quit
will
1979
and
1975
between
This is important because according to a Surgeon General's report on
the benefits of smoking cessation, "After 10 to 15 years of abstinence,
the risk of all-cause mortality returns nearly to that of persons who never
smoked."58 Similarly, a recent study finds that "[m]ost of the excess
mortalit59 from smoking could be avoided by quitting smoking at age 35
years."
Moreover, early quitting does not simply lead to more years lived in a
poor state of health. Rather, it results in additional years of healthy
have the same
life.60 After fifteen years of abstinence, former smokers
61
number of healthy years remaining as never smokers.
So it appears that many smokers smoke while they are young and
then quit before smoking significantly reduces their life expectancy.
Moreover, among those who do not quit in their mid-30s, many quit in
middle age, which allows them to avoid much of the health damage they
would otherwise sustain.62 Again, early quitting is consistent with
rational, forward-looking decision making.
3. Differences in the Subjective Price of Smoking
The claim that smoking is a rational choice also finds support in
evidence that the subjective price of smoking (which includes nonpecuniary costs specific to the individual) is less for smokers than for
nonsmokers. If so, then smokers might rationally find smoking more
attractive than do nonsmokers, which could explain why some people

55. Id. at 254.
56. Id. at 253-54.
57. Compare the findings of Philip DeCicca and his colleagues, who use longitudinal data that
allow them to track the smoking status of a large sample of people from 1992, when most of the sample
members were high school seniors, to 2000, when most of the sample members were around 26-years
Cigarette Taxes and the Transition from Youth to Adult Smoking: Smoking
old. Philip DeCicca et al.,
Initiation, Cessation, and Participation, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 904, 904 (2008) [hereinafter DeCicca et
al., Transition]. DeCicca and his colleagues find that of those who were smokers in 1992, 34% had quit
by2000. Id. at911.
58. 1990 SURGEON GEN.'S REPORT, supra note 50, at 9.
supra note 50, at 994.
59. Taylor et al.,
60. Truls Ostbye & Donald Taylor, The Effects of Smoking on Years of Healthy Life (fliL) Lost
Among Middle-Aged and Older Americans, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 531, 354 (2004).
61. Id.
62. Pierce & Gilpin, supra note 52, at 254; SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 79 ("Virtually all the
excess mortality from smoking could be avoided by quitting smoking at age 35, and most of it by
stopping smoking in middle age.").

2012]

PATERNALISTIC CIGARETrE TAXES

smoke and others do not.
a. PreferenceHeterogeneity
One reason that the subjective price of smoking may vary is
preference heterogeneity. Smokers may have preferences that cause
them to conclude that the nonmonetary costs of smoking are less than
they appear to nonsmokers.63
First, smokers may value health and longevity less than nonsmokers.
A recent study finds that smokers place substantially less value than do
nonsmokers on the non-pecuniary costs, e.g., health and inconvenience
64
costs, associated with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).
COPD is a highly debilitating disease that can be caused by smoking but
that has other causes as well, e.g., exposure to chemicals and outdoor
pollution.65 The study finds that smokers would be less willing than
nonsmokers to pay a higher cost of living in order to live in a less
polluted area where the risk of COPD is lower. 66 Also, smokers would
be less willing to undergo surgery to cure COPD if the surgery posed a
risk of death.67 These findings suggest that smokers are more willing
than nonsmokers to cope with COPD and other smoking-related
illnesses, which would reduce the subjective health costs of smoking.68
Consistent with these findings are several studies that show that
smokers demand a much smaller wage premium in exchange for
undertaking employment that exposes them to a high risk of injury. 69 If
smokers place less value on health and longevity than do nonsmokers,
63. See, e.g., VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION; supranote 12, at 109-10.
64. Ahmed Khwaja et al., Do Smokers Value Their Health andLongevity Less?, 52 I.L. & ECON.
171, 191 (2009) [hereinafter Khwaja et al., Health and Longevity]. But see Ahmed Khwaja et al.,
Evidence on Preferences andSubjective Beliefs of Risk Takers; The Case ofSmokers, 24 INT'L J. INDUS.
ORG. 667, 678-81 (2006) [hereinafter Khwaja et al., Evidence on Preferences] (noting that answers did
not vary by smoking status in a survey asking respondents to choose how much they would be willing to
pay to have guaranteed perfect health for 10 years, for a pill that was completely effective at preventing
Alzheimer's disease, and for a pill that was completely effective at preventing cancer).
65. Khwaja et al., Health andLongevity, supra note 64, at 171-73.
66. Id. at 174-77.
67. Id. at 177-80.
68. Id. at 191. Khwaja considers the possibility that causality runs in the other direction, i.e.,
smoking causes smokers to place a lower value on health. Id. at 192. He suggests that this is not the
case. Id. at 192. First, many older smokers quit for health reasons so that every smoker could not have
convinced herself that good health is not valuable. Id. at 192. Second, several studies show that
smokers are overly pessimistic about their future health. Id. at 192-93. Khwaja also points out that
even if smoking changes attitudes toward health, it is not clear why policy makers should ignore the
stated preferences of adult smokers, once those preferences have formed. Id. at 193.
69. Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking and OtherRisky Behaviors, 28 J. DRUG ISSUES 645,
657-59 (1998) [hereinafter Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking]; Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette
Smoking, Seatbelt Use, and Differences in Wage-Risk Tradeoffs, 25 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 202, 225
(1990) [hereinafter Hersch & Viscusi, Wage-Risk Tradeoffs].
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they should require less compensation for70risking injury at work. And
that is exactly what the evidence indicates.
Second, smokers may discount the future at a higher rate than
nonsmokers. Those with high (impatient) discount rates should find
smoking more attractive because they would place a lower present value
on the associated health costs, the most serious of which generally occur
late in life.71 But the evidence on this point is mixed. Some studies
surprisingly find either no relationship between smoking and discount
rates or find that smokers have lower discount rates than nonsmokers.72
But other studies reach a different conclusion.73 For example, Robert
Scharff and W. Kip Viscusi use data on wages and job fatality risks to
estimate discount rates for smokers and nonsmokers implicit in
decisions regarding risky employment.74 Scharff and Viscusi find that
even after controlling for confounding variables, smokers' occupational
choices suggest that they have substantially higher discount rates than
nonsmokers.75 In other words, even in areas of life unrelated to
smoking, smokers place less weight on future costs. A broad pattern
among smokers of discounting the future at a higher rate than
nonsmokers could reflect differences in tastes, rather than merely
irrational myopia among smokers with respect to the smoking decision.
Third, smokers may generally have greater tolerance for risk than do
nonsmokers, even regarding risks not directly related to smoking.76 A
penchant for risky behavior may simply be a function of the two
preferences previously discussed. If smokers value health and longevity
less and have a higher discount rate than nonsmokers, then they would
70. See Viscusi, RISKY DECISION, supranote 12, at 109-15.
71. Robert L. Scharff & W. Kip Viscusi, Heterogeneous Rates of Time Preference and the
Decision to Smoke 19-20 (Vanderbilt L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 08-31, 2008) ('Given the latency
period before many of the most severe smoking risks are manifested, people with greater individual
rates of time preference will be influenced less by the discounted value of the health losses and will be
more likely to be smokers."); SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 16 ("[M]ost adverse health effects from
smoking, including excess mortality, occurs [sic] after age 50.").
72. E.g., Harrell Chesson & W. Kip Viscusi, The Heterogeneity of Time-Risk Tradeoffs, 13 J.
BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 251, 251 (2000); Khwaja et al., Time Preference, supra note 37, at
927.
73. Scharff & Viscusi, supra note 71, at 19-20; Glenn W. Harrison et al., Individual Discount
Rates and Smoking: Evidencefrom a Field Experiment in Denmark, 29 J.HEALTH ECON. 708, 717
(2010) (finding that among Danish adults, male smokers have a higher discount rate than male
nonsmokers, but failing to rule out the possibility that female smokers have the same discount rate as
female nonsmokers).
74. Scharff& Viscusi, supra note 71, at 19-20.
75. Id. at 19-20.
76. Jalm K. Hakes & W. Kip Viscusi, Automobile Seatbelt Usage and the Value of a Statistical
Life, 73 S. ECON. J. 659, 670 (2007); Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 659; Robert B.
Barsky et al., PreferenceParametersand BehavioralHeterogeneity:An ExperimentalApproach in the
Health and Retirement Study, 112 Q.J. ECON. 537, 551-54 (1997); Hersch & Viscusi, Wage-Risk
Tradeoffs, supra note 69, at 225.
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be more likely to take risks across many domains, given that risk taking
often involves trading off the possibility of injury or future health
damage in exchange for current rewards. 7 But another possibility is
that tolerance for risk is a distinct characteristic that generally influences
behavior.78 Either way, if smokers are generally prone to greater risk
taking, that suggests a lower subjective price of smoking.
A growing body of research suggests that smokers take more risks
than nonsmokers and that this greater risk taking reflects a broad pattern
of behavior not limited to the decision to smoke. 79

Even after

controlling for age, education, and other demographic characteristics,
smokers are less likely to take precautions against health risks,
specifically by wearing a seat belt, flossing, and regularly checking their
blood pressure.8 0 Smokers are also more likely to report that they take
more risks than the average person. 81 Even after controlling for
demographic characteristics, smokers are more likely to work in
industries in which the risk of injury is high. 2 Additionally, as already

noted, smokers demand less of a wage premium than nonsmokers for
undertaking risky employment.8 3

And even after controlling for

industry risk, smokers are more likely to get injured on the job.

4

injured at home, which again
Smokers are also more likely to jet
5
suggests a high degree of risk taking.
b. Differences in Risk Perceptions

A second reason that the subjective price of smoking may vary is that
smokers' perceptions of the risks of smoking may be lower than those of
nonsmokers.8 6 As discussed below, many people, including smokers,
87
substantially overestimate the health risks associated with smoking.
But smokers' estimates generally are somewhat lower (i.e., closer to

77. Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 648.
78. Barsky et al., supra note 76, at 550-51.
79. See sources cited supra note 76.
80. Hakes & Viscusi, supra note 76, at 670; Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 659.
81. Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 653; see also Barsky et al., supra note 76, at
551-54 (using survey questions to measure risk tolerance and finding that smokers are more risk
tolerant than nonsmokers); Khwaja et al., Evidence on Preferences supra note 64, at 673, 676-78

(same).
82. Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 653-57.
83. Id. at 657-59; Hersch & Viscusi, Wage-Risk Tradeoffs, supra note 69, at 225.
84. Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 659.
85. Id.
86. W. Kip Viscusi & Jahn K. Hakes, Risk Beliefs andSmoking Behavior, 46 ECON. INQUIRY 45,
53-58 (2008); Viscusi, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 78.
87. See infra Part LB.3.
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accurate) than those of former and never smokers.8 8 Lower risk beliefs
reduce the perceived costs of smoking.
c. Differences in Life Lost
A third reason that the subjective price of smoking may vary is that
the years of life lost due to smoking may vary. Jdr6me Adda and
Valerie Lechene find that people who are otherwise healthy have more
to lose by smoking than people who would have poor health even if they
did not smoke.8 9
Adda and Lechene separate smokers into two groups. 90 The first
group consists of those who, if they did not smoke, would be in
relatively good health because they do not suffer from illnesses
unrelated to smoking. The second group consists of those who would
have relatively poor health even if they did not smoke because they
suffer from illnesses that are not smoking related. Adda and Lechene
find that on average, smokers in the first group (the otherwise healthy
smokers) lose 1.5 more years of life than smokers in the9 1second group
(the otherwise unhealthy smokers) as a result of smoking.
Importantly, the difference in years of life lost appears to influence
who decides to smoke. Adda and Lechene find that people who would
not be healthy even if they did not smoke are more likely to smoke.
92
They are also more likely to smoke heavily and are less likely to quit.
These findings make sense if people who are otherwise in poor health
are attracted to smoking because they have less
to lose in terms of years
93
of life than those who are otherwise healthy.
B. The Role of CigaretteTaxes if Smoking Is a Rational Choice
The theory of rational addiction has important implications for
government regulation of smoking. In particular, if smoking is a
rational choice, cigarette tax policy should be based on raising revenue
and forcing smokers to internalize smoking's external costs. Rational

88. Viscusi & Hakes, supra note 86, at 53-58; Viscusi, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 78.
89. Jr6me Adda & Valerie Lechene, On the Identificationofthe Effect ofSmoking on Mortality,
Working Paper 34 (Ctr. for Microdata Methods & Practice, Working Paper 13/04, 2004).
90. Id. at 21.
91. Id. at 32 ("Poor health smokers lose on average 3 years, as compared to poor health non
smokers, and 5.5 years if they are poor health heavy smokers. For individuals whose health is good
independently from smoking, the losses are greater: 4.5 years from being a smoker, and 6.8 from being a
heavy smoker. The loss from smoking is greater for individuals whose life expectancy is greater if they
do not smoke.").
92. Id. at 23-30.
93. See id. at 38.
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addiction theory does not suggest a role for paternalistic taxes. 94 If
smokers are rationally maximizing their utility, using taxes to reduce
smoking adversely affects their welfare.
This begs the question: does the need to raise revenue and internalize
external costs justify high cigarette taxes? Sections 1 and 2 suggest that
the answer to this question may be no, in which case paternalism takes
center stage in the debate over cigarette tax increases. Section 3
contains a brief note on information failures.
1. Raising Revenue
Antismoking advocates often cite the need to raise revenue in support
of proposals for higher cigarette taxes. 95 Even if smoking is a rational
choice, cigarette taxes might be justified if they are an efficient and fair
way to fund government.
With respect to efficiency, tax policy scholars generally accept the
Ramsey rule. This rule states that commodity taxes (of which cigarette
taxes are an example) should vary inversely with the price elasticity of
demand for products.96 The idea is that to the extent a tax causes
consumers to reduce consumption of the taxed good, then the tax is
inefficient. It distorts behavior, creating an excess burden, without
distortions, the government should tax
producing revenue. To minimize
97
inelastic goods more heavily.
As noted above, many estimates place the price elasticity of cigarettes
between -0.3 and -0.5. This means that although the demand for
cigarettes is not extremely price sensitive, it may not be less price
sensitive than the demand for many other products, including chicken,
98
apples, theatre and opera, legal services, and automobile repair.
Smokers and potential smokers respond to higher taxes by quitting,
cutting back, or never starting, which reduces the revenue raised. As a
result, cigarettes would not top the list of products to be taxed if the goal
is to minimize distortions.99
94. Gruber, supra note 18, at 120; Gruber & Klszegi, I Addiction Rational?,supra note 12, at
1285 ("A key implication of the rational addiction framework for modeling addiction is that government
regulatory policy toward addictive goods should depend only on their interpersonal externalities.").
95. E.g., Federal Tobacco Taxes: A Win-Win-Win Solution, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE
[last visited
KIDS, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/federal_issues/federal-tobacco-taxes
Aug. 28,2012].
96. HARVEY S.ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 354-57 (8th ed. 2008). This ignores the

issue of external costs, which is addressed in the text infra Part I.B.2.
97. Id. at 357.
98. W. Kip Viscusi, Principles of Cigarette Taxation 72-73, in EXCISE TAX POLICY AND
ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES (Sijbren Cnossen ed. 2006) [hereinafter, Viscusi,
Principles].
99. Id.at 73.
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Even if they were efficient, cigarette taxes are arguably unfair. Tax
scholars often cite two competing views when discussing tax equitythe benefit principle and the ability-to-pay principle. 100 According to the
benefit principle, taxation should be based on benefits received from the
government.1uI In other words, taxes are like user fees, and those
receiving greater services should pay higher fees. Applying this
principle, smokers should not bear a larger tax burden than nonsmokers
unless smokers receive more benefits from government. As discussed in
section 2, it is not clear that the additional government benefits that
smokers receive (e.g., in the form of government-financed health care)
justify the current level of cigarette taxes.
Those who accept the ability-to-pay principle, on the other hand,
argue that taxation should be based on ability to pay, which is generally
thought to increase with income. 02 Contrary to this principle, cigarette
taxes are very regressive, imposing a substantial10 and
disproportionate
3
burden on low-income smokers and their families.
2. Internalizing External Costs
The social costs of smoking include the private costs to the smoker
and the external costs to everyone else, i.e., smoking's negative
externalities. Most of the costs of smoking are private. 10 4 Nonetheless,
smokers do impose costs on others. These costs include smokingrelated medical expenses paid for by nonsmokers and health damage
caused by environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). If smokers ignore
smoking's external costs, then (even assuming smokers are rational)
they will smoke more than the socially optimal amount. Cigarette taxes
can potentially correct this problem by forcing smokers to internalize
external costs.0 5In theory, the optimal corrective tax equals the external
cost per pack. 1
Economists have studied smoking's externalities extensively over the
past twenty-five years. Surprisingly, several studies conclude that the
net external costs of smoking are not large. 10 6 In fact, Jonathan Gruber,
100. E.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKUA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE
DEBATE OVER TAXES 62-66 (4th ed. 2008).
101. Id. at62.
102. Id. at 64-66.
103. See infra Part N.D.
104. SLOAN ErAL., supra note 41, at 251-56.
105. For a discussion of these issues, see Viscusi, Principles, supra note 98, at 73-77.
106. W. Kip VisCusi, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL 73 (2002)
[hereinafter, VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS]; Willard. G. Manning et al., The Taxes of Sin: Do
Smokers and Drinkers Pay Their Way?, 261 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1604, 1604-09 (1989); WILLARD G.
MANNING ET AL., THE COSTS OF POOR HEALTH HABITS 62-85 (1991); Viscusi, Social Consequences,

2012]

PATERNALISTIC CIGARErrE TAXES

an economist who supports higher cigarette taxes on paternalistic
grounds, concedes that "there is a fairly strong consensus [among
economists] that the net externalities are small, on the order of forty
cents per pack or less."' 1 7 There are three primary reasons for this.
The first reason is that the externality associated with smokers'
medical expenses is not very large.' 08 It is true that nonsmokers will pay
part of the cost of smokers' medical treatment if private health insurers
do not base premiums on smoking status or if the treatment is paid for
by government programs (particularly Medicaid and Medicare). But
many smokers quit early in life and avoid serious health problems. 10 9 In
addition, while inveterate smokers use more health care resources earlier
in life, they also die sooner, which significantly reduces medical
110
expenses during old age and saves money for the Medicare program.
Premature death also reduces the external costs associated with nursing
home care.111
The second reason is that smoking actually benefits nonsmokers
through its effects on Social Security and private pensions.112 Smokers
contribute to Social Security during their working lives, but because
they have a shorter life span, they receive substantially fewer benefits
than nonsmokers. 13 Similarly, smokers receive fewer benefits from
private employers' defined benefit pension plans, which in many
respects operate like Social Security.' 14 As a result, smoking actually
saves money for Social Security and defined benefit plans, resulting in a
subsidy to nonsmokers. 1 5 This substantially offsets the external costs of
smoking and reduces the need for any corrective tax.
Accounting for pension and medical savings due to premature death
is generally accepted by economists, but has generated significant
controversy outside the economics profession.'"1 Some argue that
acknowledging these savings is immoral and implies that smokers'
premature deaths are socially desirable. 1 7 The problem with this
position is that many antismoking advocates claim that smokers are not
supra note 2, at 92-93.
107. Gruber, supra note 18, at 120.
108. E.g., Viscusi, SMOKE-FILLED ROoMS, supra note 106, at 73.
109. Kenneth E. Warner et al., Criteria for Determining an Optimal Cigarette Tax: An
Economist's Perspective, 4 TOBACcO CONTROL 380, 382 (1995).
110. VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 67-68, 73.
111. Id. at 73-74.
112. Id. at 73-74.
113. Viscusi, Social Consequences, supra note 2, at 72.
114. Id.
115. Viscusi, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 73.
116. E.g., Hanson & Loge, supra note 17, at 1255-60.
117. Id. at 1255-60.
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paying their own way. This claim necessitates calculating smoking's
external costs. Including the savings to government due to smokers'
premature deaths is simply a necessary step in the calculation." 8
Government economist Jane Gravelle defends the practice as follows:
The fact of savings from government transfers due to premature death
does not imply that there is a social gain from premature death; there is
clearly a loss that accrues to the smoker who is part of society.
Nevertheless, in a straight-forward accounting for costs, the government
in its role as provider of certain services will experience financial savings
from premature death, which must be considered in determining how
different parties fare because of smoking. This observation does not
mean that it is desirable that people die early; rather it means that in
compensating relevant parties financially, if that is the justification for a
payment, a correct measure
theinto
lossaccount.a1
will only be calculated if the
taken
are of
effects of premature death
The third reason that smoking's external costs may be low is that the
externality associated with ETS is arguably small. A number of studies
find that prolonged exposure to ETS increases the risk of various
illnesses, including lung cancer and heart disease.' 20 But a strong case
can be made that most of the effects of ETS should be ignored for
purposes of cigarette tax policy. Restrictions on smoking in enclosed
spaces are now common in the United States, and these restrictions
substantially reduce prolonged, involuntary ETS exposure for those who
do not live with smokers.'
Moreover, these restrictions better target
the ETS externality than cigarette taxes, which affect even those who
smoke in isolation. 2 2
What about exposure to ETS within smokers' households? Since
smokers care about their families, they may take these costs into account
in deciding whether to smoke. 123 And as the dangers of ETS have
become better known, smokers often take steps to protect their spouses
124
and children, e.g., by quitting or by not smoking in the house or car.
Additionally, household costs may be internalized via explicit or
implicit bargaining. 125 For example, spouses may agree that if the

118. E.g., Viscusi, Social Consequences, supra note 2, at 72.
119. JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-1053 E, THE PROPOSED TOBACCO
SETrLEMENT: WHO PAYS FOR THE HEALTH COSTS OF SMOKING? 3 (1998).
120. See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 223-31 (reviewing the literature); VISCUSi, SMOKEFILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 104-21 (same).
121. See VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED RooMs, supra note 106, at 101.
122. Viscusi, Principles, supra note 98, at 82.
123. SLOAN ET AL.,supra note 41, at 219-21.
124. See, e.g., Viscusi & Hakes, supra note 86, at 55-57 (finding that married smokers are more
likely to quit); Viscusi, Principles, supra note 98, at 82.
125. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 219-21.
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smoking spouse continues to. smoke, the nonsmoking spouse may treat
himself or herself to certain indulgences. In the extreme case, the
nonsmoking spouse may threaten divorce. This type of argument is less
convincing with respect to costs imposed on children, who are not in a
good position to bargain for themselves.1 26 But most of the costs of ETS
are imposed on the smoker's spouse, 127 and a strong case exists for
treating these costs as private.
Largely because of the three reasons just cited, several economic
studies estimate the net external costs of smoking at significantly less
than the current nationwide average tax of $2.18 per pack. 2 8 As already
noted, these estimates are somewhat controversial, but my goal is not to
resolve the controversy. Rather, my point is simply that a strong case
can be made that externalities do not justify further cigarette tax
increases. If that is true, then advocates of higher cigarette taxes must
rely on paternalism.
3. Note on Information Failures
A person contemplating smoking (or quitting smoking) must be well
informed in order to make a rational decision. This does not mean that
she must be omniscient. Out of necessity, she faces the uncertainties
associated with smoking, e.g., the risk of lung cancer. But a rational
person will accurately perceive these risks given the information
available.
So even if smokers are otherwise rational, it is crucial that they have
accurate information about smoking.
For example, if smokers
underestimate the health risks involved, they might choose to smoke
even though they would not do so if they had better information. In that
126. See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 219-21; Warner et al., supra note 109, at 383
("Although most economists would accept treatment of the health of spouses as an internal cost, many
would be reluctant to apply it universally to fetuses and children.").
127. SLOAN ETAL., supra note 41, at 254.
128. See sources cited supra note 106. In a recent book-length discussion of the social costs of
smoking, Frank Sloan and his colleagues conclude that the external costs are $2.20 per pack (stated in
2000 dollars and ignoring the costs to smokers' families). SLOAN Er AL., supranote 41, at 255. But this
figure arguably exceeds the optimal corrective tax. Among other issues, the figure is based largely on
the externality stemming from the cross-subsidization of life insurance premiums. See id. If life
insurance companies fail to impose a surcharge on smokers, then nonsmokers will subsidize smokers'
life insurance via higher premium payments. Id at 181-84. Sloan finds that this subsidy is large,
amounting to $1.78 per pack. Id. at 255. Yet he expresses reservations with the conclusion that
cigarette taxes should reflect this figure. Id. at 193-94, 256. He notes that this finding is based on
historical data, which may reflect life insurers' traditional practice of not basing premiums on smoking
status. Id. at 194. Surcharging has become increasingly common, so cross-subsidies in the life
insurance market may be "an artifact of our history." Id. at 193. And even if surcharging were not
common, increased cigarette taxes would not be the best response. Id at 280 n.6. A better-targeted
solution (assuming any problem exists) would simply be to require surcharging. id. at 193.
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case, government intervention might be warranted.
Do smokers underestimate the health risks? The evidence is
somewhat mixed, but for most smokers, the answer is no. W. Kip
Viscusi has conducted several surveys that find that the average smoker
overestimates the risk of lung cancer, the overall risk of dying from all
smoking-related causes, and the number of years of life lost due to
smoking. 129 Viscusi's findings are consistent
with evidence that people
130
risks.
publicized
highly
overestimate
tend to
Interestingly, Viscusi also finds that less-educated people have higher
risk beliefs than better-educated people, and blue-collar workers have
higher risk beliefs than white-collar workers.13 ' In other words, those
whom we might expect to be ill-informed about smoking do in fact
perceive the risks less accurately. But in this case, that means that they
are more prone toward overestimating those risks. This finding conflicts
with the theory that the higher smoking 32
rate among the poor results from
involved.1
risks
the
appreciate
failure to
In contrast to Viscusi, Michael Schoenbaum finds that some smokers
underestimate their risk of premature death. 133
Specifically,
Schoenbaum asked people ranging from ages 50 to 62 to estimate their
chances of surviving to age 75 34 He then compared these estimates to
actuarial predictions. The predictions of never smokers, former
smokers, and light smokers were quite accurate. 135 But heavy smokers
(more than
twenty-five cigarettes daily) overestimated their survival
136
chances.
Paternalists frequently cite this finding, 137 but it is important to keep it
in perspective. Even Schoenbaum finds that older smokers who are
light smokers (68% of the smokers in his sample) either accurately

129. Viscusi & Hakes, supra note 86, at 47-49; VisCusi, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 6879. Viscusi estimates the true lung cancer risk level at 60--13%, while the mean risk level perceived by
smokers in his 1997 national survey was 40%. Viscusi & Hakes, supra note 86, at 47-48. Similarly,
Viscusi estimates the true total smoking mortality risk level at 130/-36%, while the mean risk level
perceived by smokers in the 1997 survey was 44%. Id. at 48. Viscusi estimates the true life-expectancy
loss at 3.6 to 8 years, while smokers in the 1997 survey estimated the loss at 10.2 years. Id. at 48-49.
The results of Viscusi's other surveys are similar. Id. at 47-49; VISCuSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note
12, at 68-79.
130. ViSCuSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 70; BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE

RISK 29 (1981).
131. Viscusi & Hakes, supra note 86, at 51-52.
132. Id. at52.
133. Michael Schoenbaum, Do Smokers Understand the Mortality Effects of Smoking? Evidence
from the Health and Retirement System, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 755, 757 (1997).
134. Id. at 756.
135. Id. at 757.
136. Id,
137. E.g., Hanson & Logue, supra note 17, at 1187-88.
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estimate or overestimate the risk of premature death. 138 Moreover, a
more recent study of older smokers by Ahmed Khwaja and his
colleagues finds that smokers are "quite accurate on average about the
probability of surviving to age 75., ' 139 Khwaja concludes that "[t]he
lack of association between smoking and optimism in risk perceptions
casts doubt on the idea that continued smoking can be attributed to a
rosy view of future risks."
Additionally, even if we accept Schoenbaum's study at face value,
cigarette taxes are not the best tool for correcting inaccurate risk
perceptions. Taxes are overbroad in that they reduce smoking even
among those who are well informed. A better-targeted approach is to
collect and disseminate accurate information, including information
about the benefits of quitting.
To summarize, a rational smoker decides whether to smoke in an
informed and forward-looking manner, weighing the costs and benefits,
including the risk of addiction and premature death. Substantial
evidence supports the claim that smoking may be a rational choice. If it
is, cigarette taxes arguably should not be increased above their current
level.
II. EVIDENCE THAT PURPORTEDLY SHOWS THAT SMOKING Is NOT A
RATIONAL CHOICE

Part I presents evidence consistent with the claim that smoking is a
rational choice. This Part describes facts that, according to paternalists,
contradict this claim. This evidence has motivated the development of
alternative theories of smoking that are often used to justify paternalistic
regulation.
A. FailedQuit Attempts and Commitment Devices
That many people quit smoking does not, by itself, imply that the
decision to start is irrational. Given that quitting can significantly
reduce the risk of premature death, it could be rational to smoke early in
life but to stop when the health benefits of quitting outweigh the costs in
138. See Schoenbaum, supra note 133, at 757; Goldfarb etal., supra note 38, at 237 (making the
same point about Schoenbaum's findings).
139. Ahmed Khwaja et al.,
Are Mature Smokers Misinformed.?, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 385, 396
(2009) [hereinafter Khwaja et al., Mature Smokers]. Despite accurately perceiving their chances of
survival, older smokers substantially overestimate the risk of smoking-related illnesses. Id. In an earlier
study using different data, Khwaja and his colleagues found that in general, smokers are overly
optimistic in their assessment of their mortality. Ahmed Khwaja et al., The Relationship between
Individual Expectations and Behaviors: Mortality Expectations and Smoking Decisions, 35 J. RISK &
UNCERTAIUNY 179, 197 (2007).
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terms of forgone pleasure from continuing to smoke. But the fact that
smokers often make several failed attempts
to quit calls into question the
0
claim that smoking is a rational choice.14
Failed attempts to quit present a problem for the rational addiction
model because it assumes stable preferences. The model does not
account for self-control problems, i.e., the inability of a consumer to
carry out the consumption plan that she deems best. 14 1 A rational
smoker who decides to quit would not later change her mind in a
moment of weakness. Moreover, addiction by itself would not prevent
her from quitting once her plan to do so is in place. She would take
addiction into account before deciding to quit. But once she determines
that quitting is worth the cost, she would be able to suffer through any
withdrawal symptoms in order to carry out her plan.
It is possible that smokers are otherwise rational, but they do not
possess information about the best method or time for quitting. If so, a
particular smoker might have to experiment with several quitting
strategies until she discovers the one that works for her. 42 Or if she
fails to quit because an unforeseen, stressful event triggers relapse, she
may try again when her stress level subsides.
Consistent with this hypothesis, many smokers do eventually succeed
14
in quitting, demonstrating that they are not incapacitated by addiction.
About half of all Americans who have ever smoked have successfully
quit.' 4 But to the extent that some smokers repeatedly fail to quit, that
is evidence that for them at least, smoking is not a rational choice.
A related issue is the use of commitment devices by smokers who are
trying to quit. Commitment devices can help with quitting by reducing
temptation or increasing the cost of smoking. 145 For example, a smoker
might avoid keeping cigarettes in her house. Or she might tell her
friends and family that she is quitting, knowing that she will be
embarrassed if she relapses. Commitment devices like these are easy to
explain if smokers are aware that they lack self-control. But these
devices are hard to understand if smokers are rational. A rational
smoker who decides to quit might take steps to reduce the pain of
withdrawal, e.g., by using nicotine gum. 146 But she would have no need
140. Over 40% of smokers report having attempted to quit in the past year, and 40/o-7% of those
attempts are successful. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., supra note 16, at 15.
141. See Gruber & Kdszegi, Is Addction Rational?, stapra note 12, at 1277-79; Becker &
Murphy, supra note 15, at 675.
142. Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 693.
143. See Goldfarb et al., supra note 38, at 236.
144. CDC, supra note 26, at 10, 85.
145. For a discussion of the use of commitment devices by smokers, see Gruber & Kdszegi, Is
Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1278.
146. Id.
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to use commitment devices that limit her choices or that make relapse
more costly. 147 Since she has complete self-control, she has no reason to
fear that she will deviate from her desired plan.
B. Regret and the Desire to Quit
Smokers often express regret about smoking and claim that they
this as evidence that smokers
would like to quit. 148 Paternalists interpret
14 9
mistake.
a
is
smoking
that
recognize
But regret and expressed intentions to quit do not necessarily prove
that smoking is irrational. Some smokers may claim that they regret
smoking and would like to quit, not because they truly do, but because
in a society that frowns upon smoking, this is what they are expected to
say. 50 They may also simply mean that they would prefer it if they
could smoke without risk.151
There is evidence that although many smokers want to quit
eventually, they are not serious about quitting anytime in the near future.
A national survey of daily smokers finds that approximately 60% report
that they do not intend to quit in the next six months. 152 And
presumably, only a fraction of the remaining 40% sincerely plans to quit
during that period. In another study, only 41% of smokers expressed
interest in taking advantage of a smoking cessation clinic. 153 More
importantly, only about 1% of the smokers participating in the study
actuall'1 54 followed through and used the clinic that was made available to
them.

147. Id
148. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., supra note 16, at 15 ("Epidemiologic data
suggest that more than 70 percent of the 45 million smokers in the United States today report that they
want to quit, and approximately 44 percent report that they try to quit each year.").
149. E.g., Hanson & Logue, supra note 17, at 1193-1209.
150. W. Kip Viscusi, The New Cigarette Paternalism, 25 REG. 58, 58 (2002) [hereinafter Viscusi,
Paternalism].
151. Viscusi, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 120. Viscusi points out that people often
express dissatisfaction with some attribute of a particular product or activity. Id For example, nearly a
third of blue-collar workers claim that they would like to leave their jobs. Id. Their failure to actually
quit does not prove irrationality. Cf Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 693 (stating that the claims of
smokers that they want to quit are "no different from the claims of single persons that they want to but
are unable to marry or from the claims of disorganized persons that they want to become better
organized").
152. Mary Ellen Wewers et al., Distribution of Daily Smokers by Stage of Change: Current
Population Survey Results, 36 PREVENTATIVE MED. 710, 714 (2003). Only 15% of smokers plan to quit
in the next 30 days. Gregory Colman & Dahlia Remler, Vertical Equity Consequences of Very High
Cigarette Tax Increases: If the Poor Are the Ones Smoking, How Could Cigarette Tax Increases Be
Progressive?, 27 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGT. 376, 396 (2008).
153. viscusi, Paternalism, supra note 150, at 58.
154. Id.
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This type of evidence is not conclusive. It could be interpreted to
mean that although they really want to quit, most smokers have given up
But such widespread pessimism would be
on the possibility.
unwarranted given that so many smokers have quit and that cessation
medications make quitting easier today than it was in the past. The
more plausible interpretation is that despite statements to the contrary,
many smokers simply do not want to quit.
Additionally, because smoking is a form of front-loaded consumption
(i.e., the benefits are realized immediately and the costs occur in the
future), regret would not be surprising even among rational smokers.
Robert Goldfarb and his colleagues explain this point as follows:
If smokers mean "I wish I didn't smoke," this is not inconsistent with
rational choice. It means only that current choices are unpleasant. The
pain of quitting can be seen as part of the cost paid for the pleasures
enjoyed along the way, analogous to being overweight or hung over, or in
debt. One can clearly regret that the bill has come due, but this regret
(in life-time terms); it just
does not demonstrate a non-rational choice
1 55
sunk.
are
benefits
the
of
much
implies that
III. INCAPACITATION AND PATERNALISTIC TAXES
By calling into question the claim that smoking is a rational choice,
the evidence presented in Part II suggests a potential role for
paternalism. This Part and Part IV discuss alternative theories of
smoking and whether those theories justify paternalistic cigarette taxes.
This Part addresses the theory that smoking results from incapacitation.
Some doctors and public health advocates believe that once addicted,
smokers do not choose to smoke but are instead incapacitated by
addiction, which is sometimes viewed as a disease. 156 If smoking results
from incapacitation, then arguably, the government should try to
eliminate it, and cigarette taxes might assist in this effort.
But there are reasons to believe that incapacitation does not explain
all or even most smoking behavior. While quitting is difficult, about
half of all Americans who have ever smoked (tens of millions of people)
have succeeded in giving up cigarettes. 5 7 In fact, antismoking
advocates often argue that increasing cigarette taxes causes smokers to
Moreover, as
quit, 58 a position that is inconsistent with incapacitation.
discussed in Part I, smokers are now quitting much earlier in life than

155. Goldfarb et al., supra note 38, at 235.
156. See sources cited supra note 16.
157. CDC, supra note 26, at 10, 85.
158. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, INCREASING THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE TAX REDUCES

SMOKING (AND THE CIGARETTE COMPANIES KNOW IT) 1-4 (2009).

2012]

PATERNALISTIC CIGARETTE TAXES

717

they did in the past, a development likely attributable to better
information about the benefits of quitting. Again, this suggests that
many smokers are not incapacitated by addiction and can quit if they
wish to do so.
In addition, even if we assume that some smokers are incapacitated
by addiction, it is not clear that cigarette taxes are an appropriate
response. To the extent that smokers cannot quit, the taxes effectively
punish them for their dependence, which raises fairness concerns.!
These concerns are especially serious given that smokers are
disproportionately poor so that cigarette taxes impose a heavy financial
burden on them. 160

So for those who take incapacitation seriously, the argument for
cigarette taxes appears to rest on the belief that they will deter people
from starting to smoke. But the evidence for incapacitation is arguably
not strong enough to justify interfering with the smoking decisions of
informed adults. And to the extent that the goal is to prevent children
from taking up smoking, taxes are a blunt tool. Better-targeted
alternatives exist, including raising the minimum age for legal sale of
cigarettes to twenty-one-an approach considered in more detail in Part
V.

159. Cf Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, Perspectives on Policy: Introduction, in
REGULATING TOBACCO 3, 5 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001) ("[T]he greater
weight one attaches to the power of addiction, the stronger the equitable argument that tobacco taxation
is a form of punishment for those who simply cannot quit.").
160. Setting aside issues of fairness, whether it would be efficient to impose a tax on smokers who
are incapacitated by addiction depends on what the government does with the revenue. Conventional
analysis assumes that the social cost of taxation stems from the excess burden created when taxpayers
alter their behavior to avoid the tax. If a taxpayer does not alter her behavior but chooses instead to
simply pay the tax, the tax that she pays involves a private cost to her but does not represent a social
cost. The reason is that the government (directly or indirectly) transfers the money to other persons.
Simply put, it is not obvious that a social loss occurs when the government takes a dollar from A and
gives it to B. (Note however that aggregate welfare would decline if the utility that A would have
derived from spending the dollar exceeds that derived by B, which might be the case, e.g., if B is richer
than A.) According to this view, the tax revenue collected from smokers does not represent a social
cost, even if the smokers have no choice but to pay it owing to their addiction. For a discussion of the
conventional analysis, see ROSEN & GAYER, supranote 96, at 331-38; MANKIW, supra note 13, at 15972.
An alternative view has been proposed by public choice scholars. See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, THE
ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING 11-25, 73-77 (1989). They argue that
government spending can involve social costs apart from the excess burden arising from taxpayer
attempts to avoid taxes. One reason is resources spent on rent seeking. Id. at 73-77. Another is that the
government often does not directly transfer money from taxpayers to favored groups. Rather, for
political reasons, the transfers frequently must be disguised in the form of inefficient projects or
subsidies, the costs of which may substantially outweigh the benefits. Id. at 11-25, 76-77. The end
result is that the cost to taxpayers of government transfers may exceed the benefit to the recipients of
those transfers, which entails a social cost.
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IV. IMPERFECT RATIONALITY AND PATERNALISTIC TAXES

As discussed in Part I, the standard approach in economics is to
assume that consumers behave rationally to maximize their own utility.
So it is not surprising that conventional economists and economically
oriented legal scholars typically emphasize consumer sovereignty and
are skeptical of paternalism. 16 1 But this skepticism has been questioned
in recent years. A number of economists and legal scholars use
evidence from psychology and behavioral economics to argue that
people suffer from self-control problems, cognitive limitations, and
cognitive biases, all of which can prevent rational utility
argue that these failures of
maximization. 162 And some scholars
63
rationality drive smoking behavior.'
Theories based on imperfect rationality differ from the notion that
smokers are incapacitated by addiction. The proponents of these
theories do not deny that smoking is a choice. They claim instead that
the choice is flawed. In that sense, the use of imperfect rationality to
explain smoking represents a less radical departure from rational
addiction theory. Yet imperfect rationality still provides a basis for
paternalism.
Nevertheless, this Part argues that imperfect rationality does not
justify paternalistic cigarette taxes. The primary reason is heterogeneity.
Some smokers may smoke because of failures of rationality, but for
others, smoking appears to be a rational choice. For example, as
discussed in Part I, nearly half of modem smokers quit early enough to
avoid serious health damage, including premature death.164 And given
current trends, that figure is likely to increase in the future. 165 Many
people smoke as young adults and then quit before the risk becomes
high, which suggests rational calculation. If smokers are in fact
heterogeneous, then the government must trade off the welfare of those
who might benefit from paternalistic taxes (i.e., those who smoke
because they are imperfectly rational) against the welfare of those who
will be burdened (i.e., those who smoke as a rational choice).
In addition to heterogeneity, government failure creates an obstacle to
effective paternalistic taxes. In particular, the government faces
important information constraints, including a lack of information about
161. E.g., Calcott, supra note 14, at 39-41; STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 86-88.
162. See sources cited supra note 18.
163. Gruber & KOszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1285-86; Hanson & Logue,
supra note 17, at 1181-1223.
164. Michel Grignon has noted the importance of this fact to the debate over paternalistic smoking
regulations. Michel Grignon, An Empirical Investigation of Heterogeneity in Time Preferences and

Smoking Behaviors, 38 J.Socio-EcoN. 739, 739-40 (2009).
165. Pierce & Gilpin, supra note 52, at 253-54.
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the extent to which imperfect rationality causes people to smoke. The
government also lacks control over smokers' responses to taxation,
which are often harmful to the smokers themselves.
To better explain why heterogeneity and government failure make
paternalistic taxes undesirable, subparts A and B focus on the model of
smoking developed by Jonathan Gruber and Botond K6szegi. Gruber
and K6szegi argue that smoking is suboptimal because
smokers have
166
self-control problems that prevent them from quitting.
I concentrate on the Gruber-K6szegi model because it is well
developed and is prominent in both the legal and economic literature.
Additionally, Gruber and K6szegi have used this model to advocate
large cigarette taxes.' 67 But I recognize that other scholars have
proposed alternative theories of smoking that are based on different
failures of rationality.168 And while this Article does not address all of
these theories in detail, the problems posed by heterogeneity and
government failure are relevant to them as well. To illustrate this point,
subpart C discusses the claim that smoking results from optimism bias
among smokers.
Another significant drawback of paternalistic taxes is their
regressivity. Even if the taxes benefit some smokers by forcing them to
quit, they place a substantial burden on the many low-income persons
who continue to smoke. Subpart D elaborates on this point.
Given the problems with paternalistic taxes, it is beneficial to
consider alternatives that are more suitable for a heterogeneous
population, that pose a lower risk of government failure, and that do not
burden the poor. Subpart E discusses several products and policies that
meet these criteria.
A. The Gruber-KszegiSelf-Control Tax
A rational smoker has no problem with self-control. In other words,
she carries out her desired consumption plan without difficulty. So if
she decides to quit smoking, she is able to do so, her addiction
notwithstanding.
But as discussed in Part II, smokers sometimes have trouble quitting
and seek the aid of commitment devices that make smoking difficult or
expensive. These devices are hard to explain if smokers are rational but
make sense for smokers who lack sufficient self-control to quit without
166. Gruber& Kfszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1285-94.
167. GRUBER & KfSZEoI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 17 (noting that the optimal cigarette
tax could be as high as S14 per pack).
168. For a discussion of several of these theories, see Hanson & Logue, supra note 17, at 11861209.
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them.
In addition to evidence regarding the use of commitment devices,
several studies support the claim that at least some smokers have selfcontrol problems. For example, Joni Hersch finds that smokers who are
currently trying to quit after having previously failed are more likely to
support smoking restrictions in public areas than smokers who are trying
169 She interprets this as evidence that smokers
to quit for the first time*.
who have tried unsuccessfully to quit in the past are aware that they lack
self-control and wish to use smoking restrictions as a commitment
device that reduces their opportunity to smoke. 70
Similarly, Gruber and Sendhil Mullainathan find evidence that higher
cigarette taxes reduce self-reported unhappiness among those with a
Although some scholars question the
propensity to smoke. 171
significance of this finding, 72 Gruber and Mullainathan emphasize that
it is consistent with the claim that smokers lack self-control and benefit
devices that reduce smoking, including cigarette
from commitment
73
taxes.

1

Gruber and Botond K6szegi have used this and similar evidence to
argue in favor of paternalistic cigarette taxes. 174 They argue that
smokers have time-inconsistent preferences, which result in self-control
problems. 175 Simply put, a smoker might plan to quit tomorrow, but
when tomorrow comes, she changes her mind and continues smoking.
Gruber and K6szegi claim that self-control problems result from
hyperbolic discounting, which causes smokers to be present-biased and
to place too little weight on smoking's long-term health

169. Joni Hersch, Smoking Restrictions as a Self-Control Mechanism, 31 J.RISK & UNCERTAINTY
5, 6 (2005). For example, based on p series of surveys conducted periodically from 1991-2002, Hersch
finds that among daily smokers who have tried to quit in the past and who are planning another quit
attempt, 24.4% support a ban on smoking in restaurants, compared to only 21.4% of those planning to
quit for the first time. Id. at 15. Controlling for demographics and other factors has only a minor effect
on thisgap. Id.at 19.
170. Id.
171. Jonathan H. Gruber & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier?, 5
ADVANCES ECON. ANALYsis & POL'Y 1, 2 (2005).
172. B. Douglas Bernheim, Behavioral Welfare Economics 26 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14622, 2008) (criticizing the claim that self-reported happiness measures internal
well-being and concluding that Gruber and Mullainathan's "finding that higher cigarette tax rates lead to
greater reported happiness among smokers proves nothing about smokers' well-being"); Fanik Gul &
Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Harmful Addiction, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 147, 151 (2007) (noting that increases
in self-reported happiness after a cigarette tax is adopted do not necessarily show that the tax makes
smokers better off in lifetime terms because ex post happiness does not reflect quitting costs).
173. Gruber & Mullainathan, supra note 171, at 21-22.
174. GRUBER & KszmEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 17; Gruber, supra note 18, at 124-25;
Gruber & Kaszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1292.
175. Gruber & K6szegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1293.
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consequences.
Gruber and K6szegi develop a model of smoking that incorporates
From that model, they derive a formula for
hyperbolic discounting.
self-control
tax
on cigarettes. 178 Subpart B discusses the
the optimal
problems with using this formula to guide cigarette tax policy. This
subpart explains the model from which the formula is derived.
Standard economic models usually assume that people place greater
weight on the present than the future and that each person has a discount
factor 179 that she uses to discount future costs and benefits.180 For
example, a person with a discount factor of 0.9 would be indifferent
between receiving $100 in a year or $90 today.'l8 Discount factors may
vary from person to person, reflecting the fact that some people are
more patient than others. But economists generally treat the discount
factor as a matter
of individual preference and do not treat discounting
82
as irrational.!
Standard models, including the rational addiction model, also assume
that people discount exponentially. Exponential discounting means that
a single discount factor applies to two equidistant periods no matter how
close to the present those periods are.18 3 Exponential discounting results
in preferences that are consistent over time. An exponential discounter
who considers $100 in two years to be equivalent to $90 in one year
would also consider $100 in a year to be equivalent to $90 today.
But certain findings in behavioral economics appear inconsistent with
exponential discounting. For example, a number of studies have shown
that if you offer people a choice between $100 in two years and $90 in
one year, many will choose the former, larger amount, demonstrating
patience.'i 4 But if you offer a choice between $100 in a year and $90
today, some of those same people will choose the latter, smaller amount,
demonstrating impatience.
A possible explanation for these disparate results is that people
engage in hyperbolic rather than exponential discounting. With
176. Id. at 1279-93.
177. Id. at 1279-82.
178. Id. at 1286-89.
179. The discount rate (r), which may be more familiar to lawyers, is related to the discount factor
(6) as follows: r = (1 - 8) / 8. Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supranote 18, at 913 n.23.
180. For a discussion of the role of discount factors in standard economic models and models
involving hyperbolic discounting, see Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 18, at 91314.
181. This example is based on the example found in Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem,
supra note 18, at 913.
182. Id.; Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 648.
183. Id.
184. Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A CriticalReview, 40 J.
ECON. LrT. 351, 360-61 (2002) (discussing these studies).
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hyperbolic discounting, the discount factor becomes smaller the closer
the period in question is to the present. 85 In other words, the person is
patient when planning for the future, but impatient in making decisions
in the present.
Hyperbolic discounting could cause time-inconsistent preferences or
preference reversals. 8 6 For example, a person might say today that she
prefers $100 in two years to $90 in one year, implying a (relatively
patient) discount factor higher than 0.9. But a year from now, if offered
a choice between $90 immediately and $100 in a year, she might reverse
course and take the $90, implying a (relatively impatient) discount
factor of 0.9 or lower.
18 7
Gruber and K6szegi assert that smokers are hyperbolic discounters.
If that is the case, then the rational addiction model requires revision.
In the standard model, a person maximizes utility
at time t according
188
to a utility function that takes the following form:
T-t
i=O

The term U,+i denotes the instantaneous utilities and 6 is the discount
factor.
Intuitively, the idea is that people make choices (such as the decision
89
to smoke) in order to maximize the sum of current and future utility.1
But because people care more about the present than the future, future
utility is discounted according to 6. Again, in the standard model,
people discount exponentially. Also, a particular individual's 6 could
range from zero to one. The closer it is to one, the greater the weight
she places on her future utility.
Gruber and K6szegi modify the standard model to incorporate
hyperbolic discounting. According to their model, the utility function
takes the following form: 190
T-t

U, +8

'Q4,+,.

6 is a long-term discount factor and is the analogue of the discount
factor from the standard model. fi is a short-term discount factor. Both
6 and flare assumed to be between zero and one.
185. Id. at 360.
186. Id. at 360-61.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Gruber & Kdszegi, Is Addiction Rational?,supra note 12, at 1280.
Id.
See GRuBER & KWSZEGi, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 4.
Gruber & K6szegi, Is Addiction Rational?,supra note 12, at 1280.

2012]

PATERNALISTIC CIGARETTE TAXES

The key distinction between the standard model and the GruberK6szegi model is that the former contains only one discount factor,
whereas the latter contains two. In the Gruber-KSszegi model, 6 is the
Between
discount factor between consecutive future periods.' 9'
just
as in
consecutive future periods, the person discounts exponentially,
the standard model. The difference is that in the Gruber-K6szegi
model, the person has an additional short-term discount factor (fl) that
applies only between the present and the immediate future.
If 8 is less than one, as it would be for a hyperbolic discounter, then
the discount factor between consecutive future periods (6)will be larger
than the discount factor between the current period and the next one
(f6).192 This means that the person "is 'impatient' when faced with a
choice between today193and tomorrow, but she would like to 'become
patient' in the future."
If a person discounts more heavily in the short-run than in the longrun, her preferences will be inconsistent at different points in time,
making her prone to preference reversals. For example, at time t, a
smoker might plan to quit at time t + 1. She makes this decision because
in discounting the health consequences of smoking, which will occur at
time t + 2, she uses J. This causes her to give health consequences
significant weight. But when it comes time to quit (i.e., time t + 1
on the future health consequences
arrives), she places less weight T6)
9
and decides to continue smoking. 4
Gruber and K6szegi interpret preference reversals of this type as
evidence of a conflict between a person's multiple selves. 195 The
planning self assigns great weight to future utility and plans to stop
smoking. 196 But the acting self is present-biased, gives less weight to
the future, and fails to follow through on the plan. Moreover, as f6
moves closer to zero, the acting self becomes more present-biased and
more prone to this type of preference reversal. In other words, a low fi
implies a severe lack of self-control.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Gruber & KOszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1965.
194. GRUBER & KOszEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 10.
195. Id. at 10; Gruber, supra note 18, at 122.
196. In discussing time-inconsistent preferences, Gruber refers to a conflict between the current
self and the future self. Gruber, supra note 18, at 122. This terminology can be confusing because as
time passes, the future self becomes the current self. To reduce confusion, I refer to the conflict as
involving the planning self and the acting self. Differences in terminology aside, what matters is that a
conflict occurs because when a smoker is planning for the future, she places great weight on the future
health consequences and plans to quit. But when she is deciding how to act today, she places less
weight on the future and continues to smoke. So the smoker's opinion about quitting depends on
whether she is making future plans (the planning self) or deciding how to act in the present (the acting
self).
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Gruber and K~szegi argue that welfare ought to be determined with
respect to the wishes of the planning self, and the wishes of the acting
self should be ignored.197 In other words, they claim that 6 is the
normatively appropriate discount factor. By using ,8,the acting self
"underweights" the future costs of smoking and smokes despite the fact
that the planning self would like to quit.' 9 As a result, the acting self
inflicts harm on the smoker, creating an "internality," or intrapersonal
externality. 199 And just as a corrective tax is appropriate in the presence
of interpersonal externalities, a self-control tax is appropriate in the
presence of internalities. °°
Gruber and Krszegi point out that if a smoker is aware of her selfcontrol problem, her planning self will demand commitment devices that
restrain the acting self, making quitting easier. 20 1 They argue that a selfcontrol tax can serve as a commitment device.2 °2
Moreover, unlike traditional paternalism, in which paternalists use
government to force their values onto others, Gruber and K6szegi claim
that the paternalistic tax that they advocate simply allows the smoker to
achieve the planning self's goal of quitting. In other words, a selfcontrol tax carries out the wishes of the smoker's planning self rather
than the wishes of antismoking paternalists.
following formula
Gruber and K6szegi use their model to derive20 the
3
for the optimal self-control tax on cigarettes (t*):
t* = (I -f)Jh.

In the formula, h equals the dollar value of smoking-related health
damage, which would include the dollar value of any years of life lost
due to smoking.2°
197. GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 10.
198. Id. at 12-13.
199. Gruber, supra note 18, at 124-25; Gruber & Kaszegi, Is Addiction Rational?,supra note 12,
at 1263.
200. GRUBER & KOszEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 12-13; Gruber & Koszegi, Is
Addiction Rational?,supra note 12, at 1263.
201. Gruber & Kdszegi, IsAddiction Rational?, supranote 12, at 1278.
202. GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 9.
203. Id. at 12. The formula that Gruber and Koszegi derive includes a variable to account for
interpersonal externalities. Id. Since interpertonal externalities are not my focus, I omit that variable.
Additionally, Gruber and K6szegi originally developed their model in an academic article. See Gruber
& Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1279-93. They subsequently produced a report
suitable for a more general audience, which describes their model and its implications in less-formal
terms, stripping away much of the mathematical complexity. See GRIUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW,
supra note 18, at 9-12. For the sake of simplicity, my discussion focuses primarily on the formula that
Gruber and Kaszegi discuss in their less-formal paper. This formula is simpler than the formula they
derive in their earlier article. But my critique of the simplified formula applies with equal force to the
more complex formula.
204. GRUBER KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 10, 16-17.
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Notice that if 8 is one, then the optimal self-control tax is zero. This
is because if 8 is one, then the person is an exponential discounter, so
her acting self and planning self use the same discount factor (6). In
other words, the acting self and planning self agree, and no self-control
problem exists.
But if f8 is less than one, the optimal self-control tax is positive as
long as h is positive and 6 is greater than zero. If j8 is less than one, the
acting self ignores health costs that the planning self would like for her
to take into account. Again, this occurs because the planning self
discounts future health costs using only 6, while the acting self further
discounts those costs using I. 205 The self-control tax remedies this
problem by effectively canceling out the influence ofi, thereby forcing
the acting self6 to make decisions consistent with the wishes of the
20
planning self.
It is important to understand that Gruber and K6szegi do not argue
that the self-control tax on cigarettes should be infinitely high. Nor do
they claim that all smoking is a mistake and that smoking should be
eliminated. Instead, they argue that for hyperbolic discounters, the
acting self does not give sufficient weight to the future costs of smoking.

And a tax can correct this mistake. With the tax in place, even a
hyperbolic discounter would rationally decide to smoke if the benefits of
doing so outweigh the costs, including the tax.207
From a policy perspective, this means that the government's goal
should be to adopt the optimal tax. According to Gruber and K6szegi,
the optimal tax is the tax that causes the acting self to give the same
weight to the health consequences of smoking as the planning self. This
is the tax that will produce exactly the right amount of smoking.
But, as the next subpart will demonstrate, estimating the optimal tax
with any precision is likely impossible. Antismoking advocates may
respond by simply assuming that cigarette taxes should be very high.
But within the Gruber-K6szegi framework, a self-control tax that is too
high can be worse than one that is too low. 208 It would deter people

from smoking even though they would otherwise rationally choose to do

205. Id. at 12-13.

206. Id. at 12-13.
207. Another way to think about this is to recognize that hyperbolic discounting only leads to
"mistakes" to the extent it causes a person to make different decisions than the ones she would make if
she gave appropriate weight to future consequences. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal
Policy, 5 ANN. REV. L. Soc. Sci. 91, 96 n.5 (2009) [hereinafter Fennell, Willpower andLegal Policy]
(citing sources that stand for the proposition that "[e]xternalities only produce inefficient results when
they lead actors to make different decisions than the ones they would have reached after taking external
costs and benefits into account, which will not always be the case").
208. C. Rizzo & Whitman, Slippery Slopes, supra note 18, at 735-35 (making a similar point
with respect to sin taxes generally).
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so. In other words, unless we are confident that the government will
identify and adopt the optimal self-control tax, there is no guarantee that
such a tax will increase social welfare.
B. Objections to the Self-Control Tax
Gruber and Ktszegi derive a seemingly simple formula to guide
policy makers in determining the appropriate tax rate. But this apparent
simplicity disappears upon consideration of various factors that the
formula either conceals or ignores. 20 9 Specifically, heterogeneity and
government failure complicate matters and cause the self-control tax to
Fortunately, as discussed in subpart E,
lose its attractiveness.
alternatives exist for helping smokers who have self-control problems.
1. Heterogeneity
Even if we assume that self-control problems explain why some
people smoke, Gruber and Ktszegi ignore the complications posed by
heterogeneity. If smokers are heterogeneous, the appropriate selfcontrol tax will vary from person to person and may be zero for some
smokers. Unfortunately, the government can select only one tax rate.
The most general evidence of heterogeneity is evidence that smokers
differ with respect to their desire to quit. If a smoker does not want to
quit, that suggests that her smoking is not due to a lack of self-control.
In other words, no conflict exists between her planning self and acting
self.
As evidence that many smokers do not want to quit, consider the
survey discussed in Part II, which found that approximately 60% of
smokers reported that they do not plan to give up smoking in the near
future. Consider also the fact that smokers generally do not support
smoking regulations. Gruber and K~szegi argue that smokers who
would like to quit will demand commitment devices if they believe that
they lack sufficient self-control to accomplish their objective.210 So we
would expect these smokers to support policies that make smoking
expensive or that effectively place it off limits. 211 Cigarette taxes, public
smoking restrictions, and even a ban on cigarettes should appeal to the
209. As discussed supra note 203, the formula discussed in the text is a simplified version of the
formula derived in Gruber and Kdszegi's initial article. But even their more complex formula ignores
the many complications created by heterogeneity and government failure.
210. Gruber & Kdszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1278.
211. It is possible that a smoker would favor government-imposed restraints because they protect
her from herself, but would still choose not to support smoking regulations because she believes that
others should be free to smoke. But it seems unlikely that additional respect among smokers for others'
autonomy explains the large gap in support for antismoking policies between smokers and nonsmokers.
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planning self (who would like to quit) because these policies constrain
the acting self (who wants to smoke), effectively solving the self-control
problem.212 Consistent with this hypothesis, some smokers who are
planning to quit do support smoking regulations. 213 Yet in general,
smokers are much less likely than nonsmokers to favor cigarette taxes
and other restrictions on smoking.214 This is consistent with the view
that many smokers do not want to quit and do not wish for the
government to assist them in doing so.215
The desire to quit is not the only source of heterogeneity among
smokers. In fact, smokers are likely heterogeneous with respect to each
of the variables in the self-control tax formula.
First, people are heterogeneous with respect to the dollar value of
health damage that they sustain from smoking (h). Gruber and K6szegi
ignore this by focusing on the "typical" or average smoker.2 16 In
calculating the optimal tax, they assign a value to h based on their
estimate of the years of life lost due to smoking (six years) and their
estimate of the dollar value of a life ($6.8 million).217 Gruber and

212. See Hersch, supra note 169, at 6 ("If smokers are seeking to quit smoking, smoking
regulations can serve as a means of fostering their own self-control.").
213. id. at 20. For example, a series of surveys conducted periodically from 1991-2002 finds that
among daily smokers who report that they plan to quit in the next 6 months, over 21% support a ban on
smoking in restaurants, compared to only 12% of those not planning to quit. Id at 15. But it is
important to note that even smokers who say that they are planning to quit are far less supportive of
smoking regulations than never smokers. For example, support among never smokers for a ban on
smoking in restaurants ranged from 57% in 1991-92 to nearly 70% in 2001-02. Id at 14. Though it is
not conclusive, the relative lack of support for smoking regulations even among those who claim that
they are planning to quit is difficult to reconcile with the position that most smokers are in search of a
commitment device that will help them overcome their self-control problems.
214. For example, among those surveyed in 2001-02, nearly 70% of never smokers supported a
ban on smoking in restaurants, while that figure was only 26% among smokers. See, e.g., id. at 14.
Among Connecticut voters surveyed in 2002, 66% of smokers opposed a proposed cigarette tax
increase, while 78% of nonsmokers supported it. Gul & Pesendorfer, supra note 172, at 151. While it
might seem inconsistent with the rational smoker model for any smoker to support public smoking bans
and cigarette taxes, that is not necessarily the case. For example, a smoker may believe that nonsmokers
(particularly the smoker's family and friends) should not be subjected to ETS involuntarily, or she may
think that cigarette taxes are a fair and efficient way to fund the government.
215. Cf Gruber & Kaszegi, Is Addiction Rational?,supra note 12, at 1294 (stating that "we have
not proved time inconsistency in smoking decisions"). A paternalist might respond by arguing that
smokers do not support government regulation of smoking because they are naive about their selfcontrol problems. See id at 1281 (discussing naive hyperbolic discounters). They want to quit but do
not understand that they need the government's help. But this argument is difficult to prove or refute.
So it opens the paternalist up to the charge that she is attempting to impose her values on smokers rather
than using government regulation to help smokers achieve their own goals. In addition, paternalists
often point to smokers' use of commitment devices as strong evidence that self-control problems are
pervasive among smokers. Given this, it is inconsistent to simply dismiss the fact that many smokers
oppose cigarette taxes or other smoking regulations that could serve as a strong commitment device.
216. GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 10, 16-17.

217. Id. at 16.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

Ktszegi conclude that h is $35.64 per pack.218 In other words, they
assume that each pack of cigarettes smoked does the same amount of
health damage in dollar terms. In fact, the dollar amount of health
damage from smoking varies significantly from person to person.
There are at least three reasons for this. The first reason is that the
health damage from smoking results from smoking over a long period,
not from smoking a single cigarette or pack of cigarettes. As discussed
in Part I, smokers who quit by age 35 (which describes a large number
of modem-day smokers) have virtually the same life expectancy as those
who have never smoked. So these smokers avoid most or all of the
health consequences, which implies that h is at or near zero, and no
reason exists to impose a self-control tax. The second reason is that
even among those who suffer premature death, the number of years of
life lost due to smoking varies significantly. 21 9 The third reason is that
people may differ in terms of the value that they place on good health
and long life. In particular, smokers may place a lower value on health
and longevity than do nonsmokers, which could explain why they
choose to smoke in the first place.22°
Second, people are likely heterogeneous with respect to the shortterm discount factor (fl). The short-term discount factor determines the
degree to which preferences are inconsistent over time. In other words,
it measures the smoker's self-control problem. And experience suggests
that people differ with respect to self-control.
More concretely, a number of studies suggest that hyperbolic
discounting is not a universal phenomenon. For example, Jesus
Fernandez-Villaverde and- Arijit Mukherji present evidence that
hyperbolic discounting is much less prevalent than is sometimes
claimed. 22 1 Additionally, in a study of smokers, Michel Grignon
concludes that "there is a considerable amount of individual
heterogeneity in the probability to state present biased time
preferences. 222 Moreover, Glenn Harrison and his colleagues find that
smokers are not significantly223more likely to exhibit time-inconsistent
preferences than nonsmokers.
Given these findings, it is possible that some or many people have aft
218. Id. at 17.
219. For example, as discussed in Part i, J&6rme Adda and Valerie Lechene find that on average,
people who have long life expectancies (because they do not have illnesses unrelated to smoking) lose
1.5 more years of life by smoking than people who have short life expectancies (because they have
illnesses not caused by smoking). Adda & Lechene, supra note 89, at 32.
220. See supra Part I.A.3.a.
221. Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde & Arijit Mukherji, Can We Really Observe Hyperbolic
Discounting? 1 (Mar. 18, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
222. Grignon, supra note 164, at 745.
223. Harrison et al., supra note 73, at 717-18 (2010).
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at or near one. Recall that for anyone with a 8 of one, the optimal selfcontrol tax is zero because the person discounts exponentially.
Moreover, even among hyperbolic discounters, f8 likely varies a great
deal from person to person.
Finally, people are likely heterogeneous with respect to the long-term
discount factor (6). The long-term discount factor reflects the degree of
patience exercised by the planning self. It seems likely that some people
are more patient than others. In fact, several studies find wide variation
in discounting among individuals. 224 In particular, as discussed in Part I,
the typical smoker may discount the future more heavily than the typical
nonsmoker.225 That is important because if a person has a low 6, then
even that person's planning self greatly discounts the health costs of
smoking. This could cause the planning self to want to smoke so that
the planning self and acting self are in agreement.
Again, if people are heterogeneous, then the appropriate self-control
tax will vary from person to person and may be zero for some people.
The problem is that the tax is a one-size-fits-all
solution that the
2 26
government cannot tailor to each individual.
As a result, if the goal is to maximize social welfare, heterogeneity
forces the government to select a tax rate that minimizes the cost of two
227
th
types of errors-under-consumption and over-consumption.
If te
rate that the government selects is too high for a particular smoker, she
might quit when she would otherwise rationally choose to smoke. But if
the rate is too low, she may continue to smoke even though she would
quit if she were perfectly rational.
In this latter case, the smoker may face a "double-cost" problem.228
She pays the self-control tax, which forces her acting self to internalize
smoking's long-term costs. But because the tax is too low, she
continues to smoke and still suffers the health damage that the tax is
designed to help her avoid. In effect, she pays the same costs twice.
Because of heterogeneity, the government needs extensive
information to ensure that the tax rate that it selects will enhance welfare
224. Glenn W. Harrison et al.,
Estimating Individual Discount Rates in Denmark: A Field
Experiment, 92 AM. ECON. REv. 1606, 1614-17 (2002) (finding variation based on demographic
characteristics); see also studies cited supra note 73 (finding that smokers have higher discount rates
than nonsmokers).
225. See studies cited supra note 73.
226. See Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 18, at 962-63 (discussing this
problem in the context of a tax on potato chips).
227. See id.
at 962 (discussing this problem in the context of a tax on potato chips); O'Donoghue
& Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, supra note 18, at 1835 (same).
228. See Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the "Fat Tax": The Role of Food Taxes in Developed
Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1254-55 (2005) (discussing a similar problem in the context of
food taxes); Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 23, at 1412 (noting that this is a problem with selfcontrol taxes generally).
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relative to the no-tax baseline. In particular, the government needs to
of
know the distribution (the population heterogeneity) of the degree 229
costs.
health
smoking-related
of
and
self-control problems
Unfortunately, the government does not have (and is unlikely to obtain)
this information.
In addition, the problems created by heterogeneity will be
exacerbated if smokers who have self-control problems are significantly
less responsive to cigarette taxes than those who do not.23° In that case,
the taxes will simply burden rational smokers without benefitting
smokers who lack self-control. On this point, Jason Fletcher and his
colleagues find evidence that younger smokers who have low selfcontrol and high discount rates are not very responsive to cigarette
taxes.23 1 Fletcher concludes that "[t]hose who have the least willpower
may need the most help in quitting but are unresponsive to taxes.
2. Imperfect Information
Government failure also creates problems for the self-control tax.
The first source of failure is the government's lack of complete
information.233 The government lacks the information necessary to
estimate the variables in the self-control tax formula with adequate
precision. It also lacks information about factors that are relevant to
determining the optimal self-control tax but that are not accounted for in
the formula. Obtaining the necessary information would be challenging
even if smokers were homogeneous, but the fact that smokers are
heterogeneous worsens the problem.
The first variable about which the government needs information is
the dollar value of the health damage resulting from smoking (h). This
variable depends in large part on the value assigned to the years of life
that smokers lose due to smoking. Valuing life is not easy, so
estimating h would be difficult even if smokers were homogeneous.
But, as already discussed, h varies from smoker to smoker and is at or
near zero for those smokers who avoid premature death by quitting early
in life. Again, Gruber and K6szegi deal with this fact by focusing on the
typical smoker in their calculations. 234 Unfortunately, this approach
229. Cf Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 18, at 963 (discussing the
information required to determine the optimal potato chip tax if the population is heterogeneous).
230. See O'Donoghue & Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, supra note 18, at 1835.
231. Jason Fletcher et al., Tobacco Use, Taxation and Self-Control in Adolescence 12 (June 25,
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
232. Id. at 1.
233. For a discussion of the information required to allow the government to correct various
failures of rationality, see generally Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem,supra note 18.
234. See GRUBER & KfSzEG, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 10, 16-17 (stating that their
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produces a tax rate that is far too high for the many smokers who
experience significantly less than average health damage.
The next two variables about which the government needs
information are the short-term discount rate (f) and the long-term
discount rate (6). Recall that these variables are designed to measure the
smoker's self-control problem (fl) and long-run level of patience ().
We might expect that placing a value on traits like self-control and
patience would be difficult. So it comes as no surprise that economists
have had trouble estimating discount rates. In a review of the literature,
Shane Frederick and his colleagues find "tremendous variability in the
estimates" from one study to the next.235 The estimated annual discount
rates "range from -6 percent to infinity., 236 Moreover, "[T]here is no
evidence of methodological
progress; the range of estimates is not
237
shrinking over time."
Even if the government could accurately estimate h, 8, and 6, its work
would not be finished. The formula presented above is a simplified
version that ignores addiction. Gruber and K6szegi derive another,
more complex formula that incorporates addiction.2 38 This second
formula contains even more variables, and while they note that the
optimal tax is "quite sensitive" to these additional variables, Gruber and
K6szegi concede that their values are not clear.239 As a result, they
present various estimates of the optimal tax based on a range of
values. 240
The government's inability to estimate with precision the variables in
the self-control tax formula is problematic because the optimal tax rate
is very sensitive to these variables. To illustrate, consider the effects of
varying only fl. Gruber and K6szegi admit that a precise measure offl is
calculations "use the fact that smokers die on average six years earlier").
235. Frederick et al., supra note 184, at 377.
236. Id.

237. Id. To compound the problem, contrary to the Gruber-K6szegi model, a hyperbolic
discounter does not have only two discount factors. The model is misleading because by assuming only
two discount factors it reflects "quasi-hyperbolic" discounting. Economists sometimes assume quasihyperbolic discounting, not because empirical evidence suggests that people are quasi-hyperbolic
discounters, but because it is easier to model than true hyperbolic discounting. A true hyperbolic
discounter has many discount factors because discount rates (which determine the discount factor)
steadily decrease with distance from the present. For example, Richard Thaler estimated three annual
discount rates varying with time horizon-345% over a one-month horizon, 120% over a one-year
horizon, and 19% over a ten-year horizon. Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic
Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201, 204 (1981). If people are hyperbolic discounters, then the
government has to estimate not just two discount factors, but many. For further discussion of this issue,
see Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 18, at 925-27.
238. Gruber and Kdszegi derive this formula in their initial article. Gruber & K6szegi, Is
Addiction Rational?,supra note 12, at 1279-92.
239. Gruber & Kaszegi, IsAddiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1291.
240. Id.
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unavailable so they provide a range of estimates of the optimal self/equals one, then the
control tax depending on various values oft8.241 If]
optimal tax is zero (because people are exponential discounters).242 But
according to Gruber and K6szegi, the optimal tax is
if 8 equals 0.6, then,
243
pack.
per
$14.26
These calculations show that even if the government knew the
appropriate values for the variables other than /8(which it does not), it
would still be difficult to determine the optimal self-control tax with any
precision. Moreover, simply adopting the highest estimate (e.g., on the
grounds that a higher tax will reduce smoking more) is inappropriate.
That estimate may be far too high, in which case the tax would reduce
smoking well below the optimal amount. In other words, taxes of over
$14 per pack might cause some people to quit smoking even though, for
them at least, smoking is a rational choice.
To make matters worse, even the expanded formula that Gruber and
K~szegi develop (the formula that accounts for addiction) ignores
factors relevant to the optimal tax calculation. In particular, Gruber and
K~szegi assume that if a smoker suffers from a self-control problem, a
tax that corrects that problem will make her better off. This assumption
is not necessarily true. Gregory Besharov demonstrates that departures
from rationality do not always lead to suboptimal choices. 244 Instead,
one failure of rationality may offset another. 245 For example, if a
smoker suffers from cognitive biases as well as a self-control problem,
the two may counteract one another. This means that correcting the
self-control problem without correcting the cognitive biases has
ambiguous effects on welfare. It could actually decrease welfare by
moving the smoker's cigarette consumption further away from the
optimum.
To illustrate, consider the finding that people overestimate highly
Consistent with this finding, many people
publicized risks. 246
overestimate the risks of smoking. This has the effect of reducing
smoking from the level that would otherwise prevail. 247 The bias that
leads people to overestimate smoking's risks may partially, fully, or
241. GRUBER & KOszEGi, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 10, 17.
242. Id. Gruber and Kdszegi's optimal tax estimates include a tax of $.40 per pack to reflect

smoking's interpersonal externalities. Id. Since my focus is on the self-control component of the tax,
the estimates presented in the text ignore this amount.
243. Id.
244. Gregory Besharov, Second-Best Considerationsin Correcting CognitiveBiases, 71 S.ECON.
J.12, 15-19 (2004).
245. Id. at 15-19.
246. FiSCHHOFF ET AL., supra note 130, at 29.
247. VISCUSi, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 99-100 (concluding that the smoking rate would
be significantly higher if people did not overestimate the risk of lung cancer).
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more than fully offset any excessive smoking resulting from self-control
problems. So correcting self-control problems without considering the
tendency to overestimate smoking's risks could reduce welfare relative
to the no-tax baseline. 248 Gruber and K6szegi do not account for this
possibility.

Gruber and Koszegi may also overstate the need for government
intervention. People often can overcome self-control problems on their
own.249 One way they do this is by exercising willpower or taking steps
to avoid temptation. 25° Another tool, already discussed, is a private
commitment device. 25 1
Willpower and other self-management
techniques may reduce the government's potential role.
3. Lack of Control over Smokers' Responses to Taxation
The second source of government failure is lack of control over
smokers' responses to taxation. A growing body of research shows that
many smokers respond to cigarette taxes in dangerous ways, and the
resulting harm at least partially offsets any health benefits from reduced
smoking. Gruber and Kdszegi ignore this problem.
The first undesirable response involves switching to more harmful
cigarettes and smoking cigarettes in more dangerous ways. If smokers
want a particular level of tar and nicotine, we would expect them to
respond to cigarette taxes by finding ways to extract more tar and
nicotine per cigarette smoked. 2 In fact, that appears to be the case.253
Matthew Farrelly and his colleagues find that many smokers respond
to cigarette taxes not only by cutting back on daily consumption, but
also by switching to cigarettes that are higher in tar and nicotine. 254 As a
result, Farrelly concludes that "cigarette excise taxes appear to have no
248. Rizzo and Whitman make this point. Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note
18, at 953; cf VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 61 (noting that if smokers
overestimate smoking's risks, that would tend to offset any excessive smoking resulting from ignoring
future health costs).
249. For a discussion of self-regulation and self-debiasing, see Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge
Problem, supranote 18, at 943-46.
250. For a discussion of willpower, see generally Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 23;
Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy, supra note 207; Mark Muraven & Roy F. Baumeister, SelfRegulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?, 126 PSYCH.
BULLETIN 247 (2000).
251. As discussed in subpart E of this Part, a recent experiment testing a commitment contract
designed to facilitate smoking cessation demonstrates that private commitment devices can be effective.
252. Matthew C. Farrelly et al., The Effects of Higher Cigarette Prices on Tar and Nicotine
Consumption in a CohortofAdult Smokers, 13 HEALTH EcON. 49, 56 (2004).
253. The way in which people respond to cigarette taxes is similar to how they respond to safety
measures (e.g., mandatory seat belt laws). They increase risk taking (e.g., by driving faster) in a way
that tends to undermine the policy goal. See VISCusi, SMOKE-FILLED RooMs, supra note 106, at 66.
254. Farrelly et al., supra note 252, at 54.
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effect on total tar consumption," and "the health benefits of [cigarette
corresponding increase in tar-the
price] increases are negated by a 255
cancer-causing agent in cigarettes.,
Similarly, Jdr6me Adda and Francesca Comaglia find that smokers
respond to cigarette taxes by smoking more intensely. 256 As cigarettes
become more expensive, smokers inhale more deeply, increase the
number of puffs, use their fingers to cover the side air vents, and smoke
down to the filter.257 From a public health perspective, this type of
compensating behavior is regrettable because it increases the health
risks involved.258
The second undesirable response is weight gain. Quitting smoking
might increase weight for a number of reasons. These include the fact
that smoking speeds up the metabolism and acts as an appetite
suppressant, and that quitting frees up income to be used for food.259
Empirical research on the relationship between quitting smoking and
weight gain has produced mixed results. 260 But a number of recent
studies have concluded that cigarette taxes increase obesity, perhaps
significantly.261 If cigarette taxes contribute to obesity, that mutes the
health benefits because obesity is itself linked to illness and premature
death.262

255. Id. at 55-56.
256. J~rne Adda & Francesca Cornaglia, Taxes, Cigarette Consumption, andSmoking Intensity,
AM. ECON. REv. 1013, 1013 (2006).
257. For a discussion of the literature on the various ways smokers regulate the amount of
nicotine they extract from cigarettes, see id. at 1013-14, 1025.
258. Id.at 1014.
259. Charles L. Baum, The Effects of CigaretteTaxes on BMI and Obesity, 1 HEALTH ECON. 3,4
(2009); Anindya Sen et al., Obesity, Smoking, and Cigarette Taxes: Evidence from the Canadian
Community Health Surveys, 97 HEALTH POL'Y 180, 181 (2010).
260. A number of studies find that cigarette taxes contribute to obesity. Baum, supra note 259, at
5; Sen et al., supra note 259, at 186; Philip DeCicca, Are Obese Smokers an Unintended Consequence
of Higher Cigarette Taxes? 19 (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Shin-Yi
Chou et al., An Economic Analysis of Adult Obesity: Results from the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 565, 585 (2004). But Jonathan Gruber and Michael Frakes
find that "there is no evidence of a large weight effect from smoking cessation." Jonathan Gruber &
Michael Frakes, Does FallingSmoking Lead to Rising Obesity, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 183, 196 (2006).
Similarly, James Nonnemaker and his colleagues find that cigarette taxes cause only "modest" weight
gain among former smokers. James Nonnemaker et al., Have Efforts to Reduce Smoking Really
Contributedto the Obesity Epidemic?, 47 EcON. INQUIRY 366, 376 (2009).
261. Sen et al., supra note 259, at 186 (using data from Canada and finding "a statistically
significant correlation between higher cigarette taxes and a more obese population"); Baum, supra note
259, at 5 (concluding that cigarette taxes "significantly increase ... obesity and overweight"); DeCicca,
supra note 260, at 19, 22 (finding that cigarette taxes increase obesity among women and older men);
Chou et al., supra note 260, at 585 (finding that increases in cigarette taxes have "contributed to the
upward trend in obesity").
262. Baum, supra note 259, at 4.
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4. Flaws in the Political Process
The third source of government failure is flaws in the political
process. It seems unlikely that most legislators care whether a proposed
cigarette tax increase is optimal within Gruber and K6szegi's analytical
framework. Instead, legislators view cigarette taxes as a way to raise
revenue at low political cost.263 The tax burden falls on a shrinking
minority and on a product viewed by nonsmokers with disdain. 26 As a
result, legislators can increase cigarette taxes with relatively little
resistance from voters. 265 In fact, organized antismoking advocates
actively lobby for higher cigarette taxes. 266 So at a time when
governments are desperate for revenue, pressure exists to raise cigarette
taxes, even if doing so decreases social welfare.
Widespread acceptance of the need for a self-control tax would likely
exacerbate this problem, leading us down a slippery slope to eyerincreasing taxes. The literature on slippery slope arguments suggests
that the slide down the slope is more likely to occur when "the absence
of a sharp line between different cases eases the process of moving from
268
one to another., 267 This usually results from a key term that is vague.
In our context, the notion of an optimal self-control tax is vague because
imperfect information makes it impossible to identify the optimal tax
rate with any precision. This means that antismoking advocates (many
of whom favor tax increases not because they are welfare-enhancing but
simply because they will reduce smoking) are free to use the GruberK6szegi model as intellectual cover to argue for one tax increase after
another.269
One way to resist this type of slippery slope is to follow bright-line
rules. 270 For example, an appropriate rule might be that cigarette taxes
should be based only on external costs (i.e., harm to others), not on
263. ViscusI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 61.
264. As evidence of nonsmokers dislike for smoking, consider that nonsmokers overwhelmingly
support restricting smoking in various public places, including restaurants, malls, and indoor sporting
events. Hersch, supra note 169, at 14.
265. For example, in a survey of Connecticut voters, 78% of nonsmokers supported a proposed
cigarette tax increase, which Connecticut ultimately adopted. Gul & Pesendorfer, supra note 172, at
151.
266. E.g., CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, RELIABLE SOURCE, supra note 8, at 1-2.
267. Rizzo & Whitman, Slippery Slopes, supra note 18, at 691.
268. Id.
269. The slippery slope phenomenon seems to be at work in Gruber and K6szegi's own writings
on the self-control tax. In their initial article, Gruber and Koszegi argue that their model supports a selfcontrol tax of at least $1 per pack, which they suggest is a conservative estimate. Gruber & Kaszegi, Is
Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1292. But in a subsequent paper, they suggest that the tax should
be much higher, perhaps as high as $14 per pack. GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18,
at 17.
270. Rizzo & Whitman, Slippery Slopes, supra note 18,at 738.
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paternalism.
To summarize, the government should not adopt a self-control tax on
cigarettes. Smokers are likely heterogeneous with respect to all of the
variables in the self-control tax formula. Heterogeneity means that there
is not a single tax rate that is appropriate for all smokers. Ideally, the
government would tailor the tax to the needs of each individual smoker,
but that is not possible. Also, the government does not possess (and is
not able to obtain) the information required to estimate the optimal tax
rate. Any estimates are unlikely to be scientific and will instead involve
little more than guesswork.
Moreover, many smokers react to cigarette taxes in dangerous ways.
The government cannot control or fully predict these responses, which
mute the desired health benefits.
Finally, if the need for a self-control tax is widely accepted, the
government's inability to estimate the optimal tax rate with precision,
when combined with flaws in the political process, is likely to create a
slippery slope. Cigarette taxes will continue to increase even if the tax
increases are not welfare enhancing.
C. Optimism Bias
While it is important, the Gruber-K6szegi model is only one of
several theories of smoking that incorporate imperfect rationality.271 To
show that heterogeneity and government failure pose problems for
paternalistic taxes no matter what theory is used to justify them, this
subpart discusses the claim that smokers suffer from optimism bias.
As discussed in Part I, survey evidence indicates that many smokers
overestimate the risks of smoking. But some scholars argue that this
evidence is misleading. They claim that although smokers may
overestimate the risk that smoking imposes on others, they
underestimate the risk to themselves.272 In other words, people smoke
even though they are aware of the risks because they do not believe that
these risks apply to them personally. If "optimism bias" causes smokers
to believe that they are immune from the risks that others face, then
providing smokers with additional information or warnings will not
work. In that case, cigarette taxes might correct the problem by
reducing smoking to the level that would prevail if smokers were
rational about risks.
But the evidence of optimism bias among smokers is not very
convincing. A number of studies do find that in general people often
271. For a discussion of several of these theories, see Hanson & Logue, supra note 17, at 11811223.
272. Id. at 1186-88.
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claim that their own abilities are above average and that the risk that
they face for various hazards is less than the risk that the average person
faces.273 For example, most people claim that they are better drivers
than the average person.274 And far more people claim that they are at
below-average risk for contracting pneumonia than at above-average
risk.27 5 But evidence of optimism bias specific to smoking consists
primarily of the study by Michael Schoenbaum discussed in Part I.
Recall that Schoenbaum surveyed older adults and found that heavy
smokers overestimate their chances of surviving to age 75.276
Nevertheless, there are reasons to be cautious in accepting this study
as proof of widespread optimism bias among smokers. First, as already
noted, even Schoenbaum finds that older smokers who are light smokers
(68% of the smokers in his sample) either accurately estimate or
overestimate their own risk of premature death.2 7 Second, a more
recent study by Ahmed Khwaja and his colleagues finds that older
smokers are "quite accurate on average" in assessing their chances of
surviving to age 75.278 Third, a 1993 Gallup poll finds that 65% of
smokers believe that smoking has already harmed their health and 78%
believe that they are either likely or very likely to suffer serious health
problems if they do not quit smoking. 279 Fourth, many smokers who
quit cite health concerns as the reason, which is evidence that smokers
know that they are not invulnerable. 280 Finally, the optimism bias
hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with the fact that better information
about health risks has led to a dramatic decline in both the smoking rate
and the median cessation age.28 '
At most, the existing evidence supports the conclusion that a small
percentage of smokers might be excessively optimistic in predicting
their survival chances. Moreover, it is not even clear whether this
excessive optimism results from incorrigible optimism bias or whether it
could be corrected by providing these smokers with better information
about smoking's effects on mortality.
So what does this all mean for cigarette tax policy? It means that the
evidence related to optimism bias provides no more support for a
paternalistic tax than does the evidence related to self-control problems.

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Neil D. Weinstein, OptimisticBiases about PersonalRisks, 246 Sa. 1232, 1232 (1989).
Viscusi, Paternalism,supra note 150, at 60.
Weinstein, supra note 273, at 1232.
Schoenbaum, supra note 133, at 757.
Goldfarb at al., supra note 38, at 237 (making this point).
Khwaja et al., Mature Smokers, supranote 139, at 396.
Viscusi, Paternalism,supra note 150, at 60.
Larabie, supra note 49, at 426; Khwaja et al., Time Preference,supra note 37, at 930.
See supraPart I.A.2.
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All that can be said is that smokers appear to be heterogeneous, with
most accurately perceiving the risks to themselves (or overestimating
those risks), but with some underestimating the risks (perhaps due to
optimism bias).
Again, heterogeneity is problematic because a
paternalistic tax is a one-size-fits-all solution. It may help those who
suffer from optimism bias, but it will harm those who do not.
In addition, the government lacks the information necessary to
determine the optimal tax rate.
To correct optimism bias, the
government would need to set the tax to reflect the health costs that
smokers ignore because of their excessive optimism. These health costs
include fewer years of life. So the government needs to know the extent
to which smokers who suffer from optimism bias underestimate their
personal risk of premature death. Do they completely ignore the risk?
Do they believe that their personal risk is 20% of the risk to others? Do
they differ with respect to the degree of optimism bias? This type of
information is not easy to obtain. In the end, policy makers simply have
to guess about the optimal amount of the tax. And there is no way to
know whether the tax rate that the government selects will increase
social welfare, especially since political considerations are likely to
drive the rate-selection process.
D. Regressivity
Many tax scholars believe that the government should base taxation
on the ability to pay, which increases with income. 8 2 Those who accept
this principle view regressivity as unfair. A regressive tax is one that
imposes a greater burden on the poor than the rich. More specifically,
the traditional definition of a regressive tax is one for which the average
tax rate decreases as income increases. 283 This definition focuses on tax
expenditures. It assumes that the burden of a tax is measured by taxes
paid as a percentage of income.
By this measure, cigarette taxes are extremely regressive. 8 4 There
are two reasons for this. 28 5 First, most taxes imposed on the sale of
goods are regressive simply because the poor spend a larger percentage
of their incomes than the rich, who are able to save more.
Second,
282. E.g., Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 100, at 64-66.
283. Id. at 60.
284. E.g., Viscusi, Principles,supra note 98, at 82; Gruber & Ktszegi, Tax Incidence, supranote
18, at 1962 ("Cigarette expenditures as a share of income are 3.2% in the bottom quartile of the income
distribution, but are only 0.4% of income in the top quartile.").
285. Dahlia K. Remler, PoorSmokers, Poor Quitters, and Cigarette Tax Regressivity, 94 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 225, 225 (2004).
286. Id. This might not be the case for taxes on luxury items, which are disproportionately
consumed by the rich. Id.
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cigarette taxes are particularly regressive because the smoking rate is
much higher among the poor.287 In 2009, the smoking rate for adults
living below the federal poverty level was 30.6%, while it was only
12.1% for adults with family income of $100,000 or more.2 8 As a
result, cigarette
taxes impose a large and disproportionate burden on the
9
poor.

28

Until recently, cigarette tax regressivity was not that important
because cigarette taxes were so low. But today, the average combined
federal and state tax is $2.18 per pack, which amounts to nearly $800
per year for a pack-a-day smoker.2a° Moreover, the tax burden is much
greater in many states and cities. And while cigarette taxes do cause
some low-income smokers to quit, others continue to smoke while
reducing spending on necessities, e.g., housing.29 ' So cigarette taxes
burden not only low-income smokers but also their families as well.
But as part of their effort to encourage cigarette tax increases,
Jonathan Gruber and Botond Kszegi argue that cigarette taxes are not
as regressive as the traditional expenditure-based measure of
regressivity implies.292 Gruber and K6szegi argue instead for a more
comprehensive welfare-based measure.
Gruber and K~szegi point out that the true burden resulting from
cigarette taxes depends on how the taxes affect utility. 293 This happens

in two ways. The first effect is the reduction in utility for those who
continue to smoke, but must now pay a higher price. 294 The traditional
expenditure-based measure of regressivity captures this effect. The

287. Id.
288. CDC, supranote 26, at 88.
289. The traditional measure of regressivity focuses on annual income. But regressivity persists
(though it is somewhat reduced) if we use measures, e.g., consumption, that some argue better reflect
lifetime income. Remler, supra note 285, at 226; Gruber & Kdszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at
1962.
290. See ORZECHOWSKI & WALKER, supranote 3, at iv.
291. Busch et al., supra note 29, at 266-71. Busch finds that low-income households that include
a smoker spend significantly less on housing than low-income households that do not. Id at 266.
Among the poor, smoking households also devote a smaller share of their budgets to food and apparel.
Id. at 267. Busch also finds evidence that as cigarette prices increase, low-income households spend
less on housing. Id. at 269. Taken together, these findings suggest that cigarette expenditures crowd out
spending on other goods, including necessities.
A problem with Busch's study is that her data reveal a price elasticity for tobacco of -0.986, which
differs substantially from the consensus estimate of -0.3 to -0.5. Id at 270. In other words, other
studies suggest that smokers are much less responsive to price than Busch's elasticity estimate implies.
This means that Busch's study may understate the magnitude by which smokers' expenditures on
cigarettes increase when the government increases cigarette taxes. If that is the case, then the crowd-out
effect of cigarette taxes will be even larger than Busch estimates (perhaps substantially larger).
292. Gruber & Kdazegi, Tax Incidence,supra note 18, at 1980.
293. Id. at 1960.
294. GRUBER& KMSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 14; Remler, supra note 285, at 227.
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second effect, which the traditional measure does not capture, occurs if
some smokers quit or cut back in response to taxes.295
This second effect could involve an increase or decrease in utility. If
smoking is a rational choice, utility decreases because some smokers no
longer consume a product the benefits of which outweigh the pretax
costs (according to smokers' own rational calculations). 296 This
reduction in utility increases the tax burden. But if smoking is
suboptimal, smokers who respond to a tax by quitting or cutting back
are better off, which decreases the tax burden in utility terms. 297 The tax
simply encourages these smokers to do something that they should have
done already.
As discussed in subpart A, Gruber and K6szegi believe that smoking
is suboptimal; many smokers would quit if they had sufficient selfcontrol. As a result, Gruber and KOszegi argue that by forcing smokers
to quit or cut back, cigarette taxes produce a significant benefit that the
traditional definition of regressivity ignores. Moreover, this benefit
298
increases the more responsive smokers are to cigarette tax increases.
In other words, taxes are more effective at reducing over-consumption
for smokers who are especially sensitive to price.299 Gruber and
Kdszegi claim that low-income smokers are much more price sensitive
than high-income smokers. 30 0 So low-income smokers receive a greater
benefit in the form of quitting or cutting back, which may significantly
reduce regressivity (or even cause cigarette taxes to be progressive).30 '
This argument is subject to at least two criticisms. First, as discussed
in subpart B, Gruber and K~szegi may overstate the problem posed by
suboptimal smoking. In their model, the benefit of using taxes to force
smokers to quit depends on the degree of smokers' self-control problems

and on smoking's health costs. 30 2 The more severe a smoker's self-

control problem, the more her acting self underweights the long-term
health consequences and the more likely she will be to smoke even
though her planning self would like for her to quit.. Additionally, the

295. GRUBER & K6SZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 14; Remler, supranote 285, at 227.
296. GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 14; Remler, supranote 285, at 227.
297. GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 14; Remler, supra note 285, at 22728; & Kdszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1961 (noting that "a price-induced decrease in
consumption may be good for the agent, because it softens the overconsumption due to the desire for
immediate gratification").
298. GRUBER & KOszEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 15; Gruber & K6szegi, Tax
Incidence, supra note 18, at 1970, 1977.
299. Gruber & Kbszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1970.
300. Gruber & Kdszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1975-76.
301. Id.at 1977-78.
302. GRUBER & KWSZEGi, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 15; Gruber & K6szegi, Tax
Incidence,supra note 18, at 1974-78.
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greater the long-term health costs, the more damaging the acting self's
mistake. 30 3 But we have seen that the extent to which self-control
problems cause smoking is far from clear. Also, the health costs of
smoking are much lower for those who quit early in life, which is much
more common now than in the past.
If suboptimal smoking is not as serious a problem as Gruber and
Kaszegi claim, then using cigarette taxes to compel smokers to quit will
not produce large utility gains among the poor. So shifting from an
expenditure-based measure to a welfare-based measure will not
significantly reduce regressivity.
Second, Gruber and K6szegi may also overstate how sensitive lowincome smokers are to cigarette tax increases. Even if we accept that
smoking reduces utility, cigarette taxes benefit smokers only if they
respond by quitting or cutting back significantly. Unless they cut back
significantly, those who continue to smoke bear a greater burden than
before because they must pay a higher price. Gruber and K6szegi claim
that low-income smokers are very sensitive to cigarette taxes. More
specifically, they find a price elasticity of nearly -1.1 for smokers in the
bottom income quartile. 3 14 This suggests that a 10% increase in
cigarette price leads to an 11% reduction in smoking, which is a
relatively large response.
But this finding is highly controversial. As an initial matter, it is
difficult to reconcile with the fact that the smoking rate among the poor
remains high. In fact, despite significant cigarette tax increases during
the period, the smoking rate among adults below the federal poverty
level fell only slightly between 1997 (when it was 33.3%) and 2009
(when it was 30.6%).
In addition, a number of price elasticity studies suggest that while
low-income smokers do respond to cigarette taxes, they are not nearly as
price sensitive as Gruber and K6szegi claim.30 5 For example, Gregory
Colman and Dahlia Remler find a price elasticity of -0.37 among lowincome groups. 30 6 Matthew Farrelly and his colleagues find an elasticity
of -0.43 for the bottom half of the income distribution. 307 Similarly,
303. GRUBER & KSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 15.
304. Gruber & Koszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1976. By contrast, Gruber and Kbszegi
find an elasticity of -0.39 for smokers in the top income quartile. Id.
305. But see DeCicca et al., Older Adult Smoking, supra note 43, at 926-27 (finding that older,
low-income smokers are very sensitive to cigarette taxes and stating that their findings are "consistent
with Gruber and Kaszegi").
306. Colman & Remler, supra note 152, at 376. This compares to an elasticity of -0.20 among
high-income groups. Id.
307. Matthew C. Farrelly et al., Response by Adults to Increases in Cigarette Prices by
Sociodemographic Characteristics, 68 S. ECON. J. 156, 162 (2001). This compares to an elasticity of0.10 for the top half. Id. at 161.
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William Evans and his colleagues find an elasticity of -0.32 for the
bottom half of the income distribution. 308 Finally, Nicolay Gospodinov
and Ian Irvine find an elasticity among smokers with less than a high
school education of -0.22.3 °9
At any rate, it is clear that widespread smoking among the poor
persists despite high cigarette taxes throughout the past decade. So
regressivity remains a serious concern.
E. Alternatives to Cigarette Taxes
We have seen that paternalistic cigarette taxes pose a number of
problems. First, cigarette taxes are a one-size-fits-all solution for
addressing imperfect rationality. The taxes do not accommodate
heterogeneity, and because they significantly interfere with individual
autonomy, cigarette taxes harm rational smokers. Second, using
cigarette taxes for paternalistic purposes poses a high risk of government
failure. The government may adopt taxes that are too high and that
reduce social welfare. Finally, cigarette taxes are regressive and place a
large burden on low-income families that include a smoker.
Given these problems, those concerned about the dangers of smoking
This subpart
should consider alternative products and policies.
discusses four such alternatives. These alternatives are potentially
superior to cigarette taxes in that they are more suitable for a
heterogeneous population, they pose a lower risk of government failure,
and they do not place a large burden on the poor. The purpose of this
subpart is not to commit to a particular proposal. Rather, the point is
that those who want to improve smokers' health do not necessarily have
to resort to cigarette taxes. Alternatives exist for achieving this
objective while also avoiding the problems that cigarette taxes entail.
1. The Commitment Contract for Smoking Cessation
Xavier Gine and his colleagues have proposed and tested the idea of a
commitment contract for smoking cessation.310 The commitment
contract is designed to help smokers who have self-control problems. In
308. William N. Evans et al., Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking 36, in 13
TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY I (James Poterba ed., 1999). This compares to -0.17 for the top half.
Id.
309. Nicolay Gaspodinov & Ian Irvine, Tobacco Taxes and Regressivity, 28 J. HEALTH ECON.
375, 380, 83 (2009) (using Canadian data and concluding "that there is little to suggest from our data
that the traditional regressivity perspective on tobacco taxes can be overturned, and that there is
therefore little hope that such tax increases may really benefit low socioeconomic groups"). The
elasticity for high school and college graduates is approximately -0.3. Id. at 380.
310. See generally Gine et al., supra note 30.
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Gine's experiment, a bank offered smokers a voluntary product to help
them stop smoking.311 Those who accepted the offer placed money in a
savings account for six months, after which time they submitted to a
urine test to determine whether they had successfully quit. 312 If they
had, the bank returned their money.3 13 If they had not, they forfeited the
money to charity. 314 In other words, the contract with the bank served as
a commitment device that increased the cost of failing to quit.
The results of the experiment show that smokers are open to trying
this type of product and that it can significantly reduce smoking. About
11% of smokers who were offered the product signed a contract. 315 This
take-up rate compares favorably with that of nicotine replacement
therapy and is particularly impressive considering that Gine's product is
new and unfamiliar. 316 Moreover, those smokers who were offered the
product were 35% more likely than smokers in the control group to be
nonsmokers after one year (as measured by a surprise follow-up urine
test).317 These results also compare favorably with those produced by
nicotine replacement therapy. 18
The primary advantage of the commitment contract vis-a-vis the
cigarette tax is that it is voluntary. Rather than taking a compulsory,
one-size-fits-all approach, a commitment contract allows smokers who
want to quit and who have self-control problems to identify themselves.
This eliminates concerns about heterogeneity and interfering with
autonomy. 319 The commitment contract also reduces concerns about
regressivity since it does not involve an involuntary tax on low-income
smokers. Moreover, the commitment contract could potentially be a
profitable product offered320by private businesses, reducing the need for
government involvement.
2. The Smoking License
Another approach for addressing self-control problems--one that
would involve the government-is the smoking license. 321 The
311. Id. at 214.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 228.
317. Id. at215.
318. Id. at216.
319. See Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 23, at 1416-17 (discussing commitment devices).
320. See Gine et al., supra note 30, at 228.
321. Fennell, Revealing Options, supra note 30, at 1482-85; see generally Bhattacharya &
Lakdawalla, supra note 30.
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government could establish a generally applicable cigarette tax that
would reflect only interpersonal externalities. Although the tax would
not contain a paternalistic element, smokers would also have to obtain a
license in order to buy cigarettes. The license would be accompanied by
a smart card to be swiped at the point of sale.322 A smoker who wished
to do so could establish an additional tax that would apply only to her
and that would be added to her purchase when she swiped her card.323
In this way, smokers who have self-control problems could use the tax
as a commitment device to help them quit. A smoker could increase the
tax at any time, but any tax reductions would take effect only after a
long delay, which would facilitate the scheme's effectiveness. 324 In one
version of the proposal, the collected tax would be deposited in an
the funds in the account
escrow account. 32 The smoker would receive 326
if she quit smoking and surrendered her license.
As with the commitment contract, the advantage of the smoking
license is that the additional tax that it makes possible is voluntary. A
smoker who does not have a self-control problem or who does not want
to quit would pay only the generally applicable tax reflecting smoking's
external costs.
3. Providing Information Regarding Cessation Aids
Another way that the government could help smokers quit is to
collect and disseminate (or facilitate the collection and dissemination of)
information regarding cessation aids, e.g., varenicline, nicotine gum, and
the nicotine patch.32 These products reduce non-pecuniary quitting
costs and can be very effective at facilitating successful quit attempts.
For example, the estimated abstinence rate six months after quitting is
25.4%-33.2% for varenicline (depending on dosage) and 190/o,26.1%
for nicotine gum (depending on duration of use). 328 This compares to
only 13.8% for placebo treatment. 329 Abstinence rates are even higher
for certain combination therapies, e.g., nicotine gum and the nicotine
patch.330 As a result, the medical community strongly supports
cessation aids and generally recommends their use in connection with all
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
expenses.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Fennell, Revealing Options, supra note 30, at 1484.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The smoker might also be permitted to withdrawal amounts to pay smoking-related medical
Id. At death, any balance in the account would revert to the state. Id. at 1484 n.314.
Given that this program would benefit smokers, it should be paid for using cigarette taxes.
U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., supra note 16, at 109.
Id.
Id.
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quit attempts. 3 '
But smokers do not appear to have received the message. One study
finds that fewer than 22% of current smokers who attempted to quit for
at least one day in the preceding year used medication. 332 This suggests
that smokers may be uninformed about cessation aids and are
unnecessarily setting themselves up for failure.
4. Promoting Harm Reduction
For those smokers not willing to give up cigarettes or nicotine
completely, significant potential exists for reducing the harm associated
with smoking. But the predominant attitude toward smoking among
public health advocates is "just say no. '333 This abstinence-only
approach reflects the fear that reducing the risks involved will encourage
some people to smoke.334 But despite decades of deterrence efforts,
over 20% of American adults are smokers. 335 So even modest progress
toward harm reduction would potentially prolong the lives of tens of
millions of people, which makes the abstinence-only approach
extremely difficult to justify.
Various methods exist for reducing the risks posed by smoking.336
These include substituting safer nicotine-delivery systems (e.g., longterm use of nicotine gum), smoking fewer cigarettes, and337switching to
less dangerous tobacco products (e.g., smokeless tobacco).
But because smokers seem to enjoy various aspects of cigarettes and
not just their capacity to deliver nicotine, the most promising
technologies are safer cigarettes and pseudo-cigarettes. 338 Tobacco
companies are experimenting with the composition of cigarettes to make
them less harmful. 339 Tobacco companies are also developing cigarettelike devices that
mimic many of the features of cigarettes but contain
340
fewer toxins.
So what can the government do to promote harm reduction? W. Kip
331. Id. at 106 ("Clinicians should encourage all patients attempting to quit to use effective
medications for tobacco dependence treatment, except where contraindicated or for specific populations
for which there is insufficient evidence of effectiveness.").
332. Id.at 12.
333. Kenneth E. Warner, Reducing Harm to Smokers: Methods, Their Effectiveness, and the Role
of Policy, in REGULATING TOBACCO 111, 113 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
334. Id. at 121-23.
335. CDC, supra note 26, at 88.
336. For a discussion of harm-reduction methods, see Warner, supra note 333, at 117-25.
337. Id.at 117-25.
338. For a discussion of safer cigarettes and pseudo-cigarettes, see id.
at 119-23.
339. Id. at 119-23.
340. Id. at 119-23.
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Viscusi argues that the government should encourage the development
of safer cigarettes and pseudo-cigarettes by creating a comprehensive
rating system that would allow smokers to compare the risks posed by
these products to those posed by traditional cigarettes.341
A government rating system would have two significant benefits.
First, it would allow consumers to select the cigarettes that match their
risk preferences.342 Second, and more importantly, a rating system
would give tobacco companies a greater incentive to produce safer
The government currently
cigarettes and pseudo-cigarettes. 343
discourages these products by restricting advertising and threatening
sanctions, which impedes tobacco companies from competing on the
basis of safety.344 This policy apparently stems from the belief that
people should "just say no" to smoking. But competition based on
safety would potentially prolong lives. And a government rating system
would ensure that tobacco companies could not mislead consumers
through false advertising.
Reducing the harm associated with smoking has the potential to
benefit all smokers, whether they are rational or not. Safer cigarettes,
for example, would allow rational smokers to enjoy what they perceive
as the benefits of smoking while avoiding some of the health costs. At
the- same time, those who suffer from failures of rationality would be
better off to the extent that the cigarettes that they smoke are less
harmful.
V. YOUTH SMOKING
Because they may be shortsighted or fail to appreciate how addictive
cigarettes are, most people can agree that children should not be trusted
with the decision to smoke. So paternalistic intervention to reduce
youth smoking is relatively uncontroversial. Even those who believe
that adults should be free to smoke have little reason to oppose narrowly
targeted regulation of youth smoking, which at most, delays the
initiation decision to adulthood. As a result, antismoking advocates
often argue for higher cigarette taxes on the grounds that they will

341. Viscusl, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 195. Since the rating system would
benefit smokers, the program should be funded by cigarette taxes.
342. Id. Currently, cigarette companies disclose tar and nicotine levels on cigarette packages. Id.
at 198. But this information is incomplete and inconclusive. Id. at 200. For example, people may
inhale low-tar cigarettes more deeply, which could offset the health benefits of the lower tar level. Id.
A comprehensive rating system would take into account the different ways in which people smoke
different types of cigarettes. Id.
343. Id. at 195-96.
344. Id. at 206-09.
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prevent children from smoking.345 But the use of cigarette taxes-for this
purpose is subject to three criticisms.
The first criticism is that cigarette taxes are an extremely blunt tool
347
346
for combating youth smoking. Adults smoke 98% of all cigarettes,
so they pay a significant price, particularly given how regressive
cigarette taxes are.
The second criticism is that cigarette taxes may not be as effective at
reducing youth smoking as is sometimes claimed. Early studies
suggested a youth price participation elasticity of -0.7, which means that
a 10% increase in price reduces smoking participation among youths by
7%.348 But more recent studies have produced mixed results, with some

researchers finding significantly less sensitivity to price. 349 For
example, Christopher Carpenter and Philip Cook published a study in
2008 that finds youth participation elasticities between. -0.25 and 0.56.350. Several other studies reach a similar conclusion or find even
less responsiveness. 351 As a result, one recent study states that "there
exists conflicting evidence on the efficacy of cigarette taxes with respect
to youth smoking participation. ' 352 Another study states that "it is fair to
say that there is still no consensus on whether
taxes have a true causal
353
effect on youth participation in smoking.9
One reason that recent studies find less price sensitivity may be.that
345. See, e.g., Harry Esteve, Cigarette Tax Proposals Pit Anti-Smokers against Tobacco Lobby,
OREGONIAN, Mar. 24,2011.
346. Viscusi, Paternalism,supra note 150, at 64.
347. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE PROPOSED TOBACCO SETrLEMENT 9 (1998).
348. Philip DeCicca et al., Putting Out the Fires: Will Higher Taxes Reduce the Onset of Youth
Smoking?, 110 J. POL. ECON. 144, 145 (2002) [hereinafter DeCicca et al., Fires].
349. For recent reviews of the literature, see Anindya Sen et al., Do Changes in Cigarette Taxes
Impact Youth Smoking? Evidencefrom CanadianProvinces, 13 FORUM HEALTH ECON. & POL'Y 1, 2-4
(2010), and Christopher Carpenter & Philip Cook, Cigarette Taxes and Youth Smoking: New Evidence
from National,State, andLocal Youth Risk Behavior Surveys, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 287,287-91 (2008).
350. Carpenter & Cook, supra note 349, at 297.
351. See, e.g., DeCicca et al., Fires, supra note 348, at 164 ("When we estimate models of
smoking onset between eighth and twelfth grades, the results suggest that cigarette taxes and smoking
onset are not strongly related."); Anindya Sen & Tony Wirjanto, Estimating the Impacts of Cigarette
Taxes on Youth Smoking Participation,Initiation, and Persistence: EmpiricalEvidence from Canada,
19 HEALTH ECON. 1264, 1279 (2010) (using Canadian data and finding "that while taxes do impact
youth smoking, the effects are somewhat modest"). Similarly, Philip DeCicca and his colleagues find
that "the price of cigarettes has a weak and statistically insignificant influence on [youth] smoking
participation," but find that taxes may reduce the number of cigarettes smoked by young adult smokers.
Philip DeCicca et al., Youth Smoking, CigarettePrices, andAnti-Smoking Sentiment, 17 HEALTH ECON.
733, 739-40, 745 (2008) [hereinafter DeCicca et al., Sentiment]. Additionally, a study using data fron
Canada finds participation elasticities between -0.1 and -0.3 for 15 to 19 year olds and -1.5 to -2 for 10
to 14 year olds, which suggests the possibility that "higher taxes may delay smoking participation
among younger teens until they become older and are able to participate more freely in the labour
force." Sen et al., supra note 349, at 11.
352. Sen et al., supra note 349, at 4.
353. Carpenter & Cook, supra note 349, at 290.
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many early studies did not adequately control for variation among states
regarding antismoking sentiment and nontax tobacco control policies.354
States that have high cigarette taxes tend also to have high antismoking
sentiment and to have adopted antismoking policies other than cigarette
taxes.355 So the lower youth smoking rate in those states may be largely
attributable to factors other than taxes, including social and cultural
influences.356 Several studies by Philip DeCicca and his colleagues
demonstrate that controlling for antismoking sentiment can dramatically
reduce the measured responsiveness of smoking to cigarette taxes.
DeCicca concludes that "[t]he evidence is consistent with the argument
that unobservable heterogeneity across states in antismoking sentiment
leads to 58a bias [in many early studies] toward finding strong tax
effects.

3

The third criticism is that, for many potential smokers, cigarette taxes
may simply delay smoking to adulthood, when cigarettes become more
affordable. Since the health consequences of smoking generally result
from smoking over a long period, the primary goal of antismoking
policies is not to reduce youth smoking per se, but to reduce adult
Many
smoking by avoiding initiation during adolescence. 359
antismoking advocates argue that because most smokers smoke their
first cigarette during adolescence, eliminating youth smoking via
cigarette taxes will eventually eliminate adult smoking. 360 But this view
may not be correct. As an initial matter, DeCicca and his colleagues
find that "nearly half of smokers at around age 26 were not daily
smokers as high school seniors," which suggests that many people
initiate daily smoking as young adults.36 ' (In fact, most adolescent
smokers are experimenters who have smoked less than 100 cigarettes in
354. DeCicca etal., Sentiment, supra note 351, at 745 ("We also find that indirect proxies for antismoking sentiment used in several previous cross-sectional studies do not seem to adequately control for
Transition, supra note 57, at 909differences in anti-smoking sentiment across states."); DeCicca et al.,
11; DeCicca et al.,
Fires, supra note 348, at 153-54.
355. DeCicca et al.,
Sentiment, supra note 351, at 734-37.
356. Id. at 734; DeCicca etal.,
Transition, supra note 57, at 909; DeCicca et al., Fires, supra note
348, at 159-61.
357. DeCicca etal., Sentiment, supra note 351, at 739-40; DeCicca et al., Transition, supra note
57, at 911-13; DeCicca et al., Fires, supra note 348, at 148-49; see also Carpenter & Cook, supra note
349, at 296 (drawing a similar conclusion).
358. DeCicca etal.,
Fires, supra note 348, at 164.
359. Sherry Glied, Youth Tobacco Control: Reconciling Theory and Empirical Evidence, 21 J.
HEALTH EcON. 117, 118 (2002).
360. See, e.g., AM. LEGACY FOUND., LEGACY FIRST REPORT 3, 6 (2000) ("Clearly, if adolescents
can be dissuaded from starting to smoke, there is evidence that they will likely never become
smokers.").
361. DeCicca et al., Transition, supra note 57, at 905; see also AM. LEGACY FOUND., supra note
360, at 6-7 (presenting survey evidence that about 48% of smokers who were between 30- and 39-years
old in 1998 reported having begun daily smoking after age 17).
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Moreover, several studies of the relationship between youth and adult
smoking challenge the conventional wisdom that preventing childhood
initiation permanently deters people from smoking.3 63 One of these
studies was conducted by Sherry Glied, who analyzed a dataset
involving a panel of people followed from 1979 (when they were 14- to
24-years old) through 1994 (when they were 29- to 39-years old). She
finds that cigarette taxes reduce youth smoking, but that the effect is
substantially attenuated over time.364 In fact, taxes faced during youth
appear to have little effect on smoking by age 39.365 Glied suggests that
this is a consequence of delayed initiation. 3 6 Her "results suggest that
high cigarette prices may have a more limited long-term deterrent effect
than previously believed. 3 67 As a result, "[R]educing smoking among
may not be sufficient to substantially reduce
teens through tax policy
3 68
smoking in adulthood.

Given that cigarette taxes are overbroad and may not be as effective
to
as previously thought, a better and more narrowly targeted approach 369
youth smoking is rigorous enforcement of youth access restrictions.
There is evidence that this will substantially reduce cigarette purchases
by children.370
Aside from lax enforcement, the major problem with youth access
restrictions, particularly age-of-sale laws, is that some children respond
by obtaining their cigarettes through adults. Due to more rigorous
362. Am. LEGACY FouND., supra note 360, at 3.
363. For a review of this literature, see M. Christopher Auld & Mahmood Zarrabi, Long-Term
Effects of Tobacco Prices Faced by Adolescents 3 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). Auld and Zarrabi review studies that investigate whether reducing youth initiation deters
people from smoking as adults and studies that investigate whether smoking while young causes
smoking later in life. Id. They state that "the small body of literature to date on long smoking dynamics
unanimously suggests that prior smoking does not substantially cause current smoking over the medium
to long run." Id.
364. Glied, supra note 359, at 117.
365. Id. at 126.
366. Id. at 117.
367. Id. at 132. In a study using Canadian data, Christopher Auld and Mahmood Zarrabi reach
conclusions generally consistent with those of Glied. See generally Auld & Zarrabi, supra note 363.
Auld and Zarrabi state, "Our major finding is that high prices faced during adolescence exert a small but
detectable effect on smoking patterns later in life: A 10% increase in average cigarette prices faced over
ages 12 through 18 leads to a one percentage point reduction in probability of daily smoking in
adulthood." Id. at 1. They conclude that "these estimates suggest the effect of youth price on adult
smoking behavior is almost certainly very small." Id. at 16.
368. Glied, supra note 359, at 117.
369. The costs of enforcement can be covered by cigarette taxes and by fines imposed on
noncompliant sellers.
370. Paula M. Lantz et al., Investing in Youth Tobacco Control: A Review ofSmoking Prevention
and Control Strategies, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 47, 53-54 (1999); Jean L. Forster & Mark Wolfson,
Youth Access to Tobacco: PoliciesandPolitics, 19 ANN. PEv. PuB. HEALTH 203, 225-28 (1998).
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enforcement of age-of-sale laws, the percentage of underage smokers
who usually buy their cigarettes fell from 38.7% to 18.8% between 1995
and 2003. 371 At the same time, the percentage who usually obtained
cigarettes by giving someone else money to buy them jumped from 16%
to 30%.372

Fortunately, there may be a relatively easy solution to this problem.
All states prohibit the sale of cigarettes to persons under age 18.
The
problem is that many minors have regular contact with 18-year olds at
school and elsewhere. But their social circles generally do not include
those over age 21.374 This probably explains why one study finds that
90% of adults approached by minors to purchase cigarettes are under
age 21.3 Raising the minimum age for legal sale to 21 would cut off a
major supply
source and make it difficult for children to become regular
76
smokers.
This proposal is potentially politically feasible. One survey finds that
63% of people are in favor of the age increase. 377 Moreover, the idea
has been debated in several states in recent years. 378 Libertarians of
course will be reluctant to embrace the proposal. In the words of one
California assemblyman, "I think that people. are going to wonder
whether 18-year olds who can join the armed forces should have the
right to smoke and make that choice on their own." 379 But there is a
good response to this type of argument. First, the goal of the law is not
371. Sajjad Abmad & John Billimek, Limiting Youth Access to Tobacco: Comparing the LongTerm Health Impacts of IncreasingCigaretteExcise Taxes andJPaisingthe Legal Smoking Age to 21 in
the UnitedStates, 80 HEALTH POL'Y 378, 379 (2007).
372. Id.
373. U.S. SURGEON GEN., YOUTH AND TOBACCO: PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG
PEOPLE 119 (1994).
374. Ahmad & Billimek, supra note 371, at 379.
375. Joseph R. DiFranza & Mardia Coleman, Sources of Tobaccofor Youths in Communitieswith
Strong Enforcement of Youth Access Laws, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 323, 327 (2001).
376. Ahmad & Billimek, supra note 371, at 380. There is some evidence that increasing the
minimum age for legal sale of alcohol from 18 to 21 reduced youth drinking. Saijad Ahmad, Closing
the Youth Access Gap: The ProjectedHealth Benefits and Costs of a NationalPolicy to Raise the Legal
Smoking Age to 21 in the United States, 75 HEALTH POL'Y 74, 75-76 (2005) (reviewing the literature).
If the minimum age for legal sale of cigarettes is increased to 21, it may also be necessary to require that
those who sell cigarettes be 21. Joseph DiFranza and Mardia Coleman find that "[i]n communities
where youths could purchase or steal tobacco from stores, the primary reason was that teenagers were
working as store clerks." DiFranza & Coleman, supra note 375, at 327.
377. Daniel Merkle, Too Young to Smoke? Most in New Poll Would Stub Out CigaretteSales to
Teens,
ABCNEws.COM
(2002),
http://a.abcnews.com/sections/business/DailyNews/smokingage_pol1020613.html.
378. See, e.g., Janie Har, Bill Would Raise Smoking Age, OREGONIAN, Apr. 1, 2009, at BI; Pane
Belluck, Vermont Considers Lowering the Drinking Age to 18, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at A13; John
Ritter, Tobacco War Hits Beaches in California,USA TODAY, June 21, 2004, at A3.
379. Judy Muller, Debate Over Boosting the Smoking Age, ABCNEWS.COM (Feb. 25, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/storyid=91870&pag e = l.
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to reduce smoking among 18- to 21-year olds per se, although it might
have this effect. Rather, the goal would be to reduce smoking among
children, who often obtain cigarettes through young adults. Second, in
terms of preserving freedom, raising the minimum age for legal sale is
arguably superior to high cigarette taxes, which is perhaps the only
viable policy alternative for addressing youth smoking. To the extent
that increasing the minimum age for legal sale prevents kids from
smoking, one of the primary rationales for the cigarette tax would
disappear, as perhaps would much of the political support for ftrther
cigarette tax increases.
CONCLUSION

Although they are popular among legislators, cigarette taxes are
difficult to justify using the conventional framework for tax analysis.
Smoking's external costs are arguably small, and heavily taxing
cigarettes imposes a significant burden on low-income families, raising
fairness concerns. This has led some scholars and antismoking
advocates to invoke paternalism in support of fuither cigarette tax
increases.
If smoking results from incapacitation or imljerfect rationality,
perhaps the government should intervene to save smokers from
themselves. But this Article has argued that cigarette taxes should not
be used for that purpose. Existing evidence suggests that for some
people, smoking may be a rational choice. And even if some smokers
are incapacitated by addiction, cigarette taxes penalize them for
consuming a product that they find difficult to quit. In addition,
cigarette taxes are a one-size-fits-all solution. This makes them
unsuitable for a smoking population that is likely heterogeneous with
respect to rationality. Moreover, smokers respond to cigarette taxes in
ways that undercut public health goals.
Given the many problems with cigarette taxes, policy makers should
consider alternatives for helping smokers who want to quit or who
would prefer a safer nicotine delivery system. This Article has
examined several proposals of this type. Advances in our understanding
of smoking will make other products and policies possible, creating the
potential to improve public health while leaving smokers free to pursue
their own goals.
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